Mental illness in the courtroom : does a psychiatric diagnosis affect perception of a defendant's speech dynamics on the witness stand? by Stossich, AR
Mental illness in the courtroom: Does a psychiatric diagnosis affect perception of a 
defendant's speech dynamics on the witness stand? 
Anastasia Stossich BA(Hons) 
University of Tasmania, Australia 
A report submitted in partial requirement for the degree of Master of Psychology 
(Cl in) at the University of Tasmania. 
I declare that this thesis is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and 
belief, it does not contain material from published sources without proper 
acknowledgement, nor does it contain material which has been accepted for the 
award of any other higher degree or graduate diploma in any university. 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to acknowledge the assistance of my supervisors Mr Peter Ball and Dr 
Nenagh Kemp in helping me develop and complete the current experiment and 
thesis. I would particularly like to thank Peter for his encouragement and direction. 
I would like to thank my brother, Matthew Stossich, for the time he spent recording 
the reenactment used in the experiment, and for manipulating the speech rates of the 
actors. I would also like to thank Peter Ball, Erin Kelly, Michael Quinn and Leo and 
Rosemary Stossich for taking on roles in the reenactment of the trial. 
I would also like to thank Sue Jopling, Anthea Rooney and Christine Prichett for 
aiding me in recruiting participants from the Hobart, Launceston and Cradle Coast 
campuses, respectively. 
Literature Review 
Abstract 
Literature Review 
What is stigma? 
The effects of stigma 
Prejudice in court 
Juror bias 
Contents 
Mental Illness and the Criminal Justice System 
Research Direction 
References 
Empirical Study 
Abstract 
Introduction 
Method 
Results 
Design 
Participants 
Materials 
Procedure 
Effect of Health and Lawyer and Defendant 
1 
2 
3 
5 
10 
10 
14 
16 
18 
2 
3 
8 
8 
8 
8 
10 
11 
speech rates on cooperativeness, likeability and credibility 15 
Convergence/Divergence 17 
Intent 
Innocence/Guilt 
Manipulation checks 
Discussion 
17 
18 
19 
19 
Influence of speed of speech on ratings of defendants' credibility 20 
Effect of health condition on credibility ratings 22 
Effect of convergence and divergence on perception of defendant 24 
Limitations of the present study 
Directions for future research 
References 
Appendices 
25 
26 
27 
31 
Stigma: a literature review 
Anastasia Stossich BA(Hons) 
University of Tasmania, Australia 
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Abstract 
Stigma can be seen to be comprised of three distinctive steps: stereotypes, prejudice 
and discrimination. If negative stereotypes about a particular group of people are 
accepted by an individual this may lead to prejudicial views of that group which, if 
acted on, will result in discrimination. Although contemporary Western society 
endeavours to be seen as a place that is accepting of all people, research suggests 
that there is still widespread discrimination against minority groups. One area of 
particular concern is the stigmatisation and discrimination against people with 
meI?-tal health conditions. Studies have demonstrated that people with mental illness 
tend to be arrested and incarcerated more often for minor offences, and receive 
longer sentences than their mentally healthy counterparts. This suggests that some 
form, of bias, or discrimination, against people with mental illness is probably 
occurring at some point in the criminal justice process. Understanding more about 
how a defendant is viewed by jurors and judges in court, and what factors are likely 
to influence the verdict for a mentally ill defendant would be beneficial in 
determining if stigma is present which will then inform strategies to reduce this bias. 
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Contemporary Western culture sees itself as one that is accepting of all people 
regardless of their race, religion, or sexual orientation. However, research suggests 
that discrimination against minority groups remains widespread. People from racial 
minorities are still discriminated against in court (Espinoza & Willis-Esqueda, 2008; 
Hodson, Hooper, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2005), the overweight may be disadvantaged 
in employment selection (Finkelstein, Frautschy Demuth, & Sweeney, 2007) and be 
seen to have more symptoms, and a less optimistic prognosis in psychotherapy 
(Davis-Coelho, Waltz, & Davis-Coelho, 2000), and those who suffer from mental 
illness are said to be among the most stigmatised, discriminated against, 
marginalised and disadvantaged members of Western society (Johnstone, 2001). It 
would therefore seem that, despite the cultural self-portrayal of acceptance and 
inclusiveness, an underlying bias or prejudice against people who do not fit into the 
'normal' mould remains. 
This review will first consider what stigma is, and the impact that it can have 
on individuals. It will then discuss the stigma associated with mental illness, and 
explore ways in which it affects the lives of those who have a mental illness. This 
review will also examine the impact that bias or prejudice can have on people within 
the court system, and then investigate implications for people with mental illnesses 
within a courtroom setting. The review will also discuss the over-representation of 
people with mental illnesses within the criminal justice system and conclude by 
outlining the importance of research into the presence and effects of mental illness 
stigma in court. 
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What is stigma? 
Public stigma has been described as a social cognitive process which 
comprises three distinctive steps: stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination (Watson, 
Ottati, & Corrigan, 2003). Stereotypes, which are defined as collectively held 
beliefs about the members of a social group (Corrigan, Markowitz, Watson, Rowan, 
& Kubiak, 2003), provide an efficient way of categorising information about a social 
group. Simply being aware of the stereotypes associated with a particular group 
does not automatically mean that an individual will be prejudiced, and discriminate 
against that group. However, if negative stereotypes are accepted and believed by 
an individual then that can create prejudice against that group, which in turn can lead 
to discrimination. Discrimination is the behavioural manifestation of the emotions 
and beliefs generated by prejudice. This theory of stigma provides an explanation of 
the process that stigmatisation follows, and how it leads to discrimination, but it 
does not indicate why, or how the stigma actually originates. 
Watson et al. (2003) outline possible theories for the origin of stigma against 
particular groups. These theories include the normal cognitive reaction, the kernel 
of truth and system-justification theory. Although there is some support for the 
former two theories, they also present significant limitations. Normal cognitive 
reaction, for example, asserts that societal reactions to individuals with mental 
illness are the natural response to psychiatric symptoms. However, there is 
empirical data suggesting that people with mental illness may experience 
discrimination regardless of their behaviour, simply due to the mental illness label 
(Socall & Holtgraves, 1992). Further, the lack of support for stereotypes commonly 
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attributed to people with mental illness (being dangerous and posing a threat of 
violence) (Link & Phelan, 1999) undermines the kernel of truth model. These 
theories may also actually promote stigmatisation. The present discussion will 
therefore focus on system-justification theory. System-justification theory asserts 
that stereotypes and prejudice develop to confirm, or make sense of, the systems 
within society. The theory maintains that stereotypes arise as explanations for the 
system-wide experience of in-group members. It is argued that the stereotypes do 
not provide a true representation of the characteristics of a particular group; they 
simply provide a justification for, or explanation of, the social system that the group 
is part of. For example, African Americans have been stereotyped as inferior and 
unintelligent. System-justification theory sees this stereotype as the result of the 
slavery system, where the black community was subservient to its white masters. It 
maintains that the societal justification of the slavery system was to view black 
people as inferior and less intelligent than their white masters, and that this view 
then became a stereotype for African American people; not a true representation of 
the characteristics of African Americans, but rather a way of interpreting why the 
slavery system was in place. The stereotype is therefore developed as an 
explanation of the social system that is, or has previously been at work. 
System-justification theory can also be applied to the stereotype of people 
with mental illness as being dangerous. Watson et al. (2003) propose that this 
stereotype originates from the historical treatment of people with mental illness. 
During the Middle Ages, Europeans incarcerated people with psychiatric disorders 
in prisons to protect the public from what was alleged to be a dangerous group of 
5 
people. Again, since the 1960s, when the deinstitutionalisation from psychiatric 
hospitals began, more and more people with mental illness have been put into prison 
(Perez, Leifman, & Estrada, 2003). This further reinforces the idea that those with 
mental illnesses are a dangerous group, of whom the public should be afraid. 
Watson et al. (2003) demonstrate that the idea of people with psychiatric disorders 
being dangerous or violent is not actually based on the characteristics of the group. 
They further explain that if we wish to avoid everyone with similar odds of acting 
violently, it would be necessary to stay away from teenagers, males and high school 
graduates. 
The effects of stigma 
Despite wanting to be seen as non-prejudiced, people can still act in 
discriminatory ways towards stigmatised groups of people. The findings of 
Sommers and Ellsworth (2001) provide some support for the idea that people can act 
discriminatorily despite their desire to be seen as non-prejudiced individuals. 
Sommers and Ellsworth maintain that, while there have been major changes in what 
is considered socially accepted behaviour and attitudes towards African Americans 
in the US, prejudice remains. Their research has found that an underlying bias 
against African American defendants still exists, and will be expressed under certain 
conditions. Their study presented various court cases in which the defendant 
presented as either a European American or an African American, and in which the 
issue of race either was, or was not, made salient. As predicted, the researchers 
found that when the issue of race was made salient, the jurors' bias against 
defendants said to be African American was not displayed, whereas when the issue 
of race was not mentioned, a clear bias could be seen. Sommers and Ellsworth 
argue that when there is an African American defendant, and race is made salient in 
the trial, the jurors' desire to fit the non-prejudiced, socially accepted profile is 
triggered. However, when race is not made salient in the case, this is not triggered, 
and thus the underlying bias against the African American defendant is expressed. 
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The idea that discrimination can be expressed implicitly, or unconsciously, 
as a result of the stigma associated with a particular group of individuals is further 
evidenced in a study by Teachman, Wilson and Komarovskaya (2006). Their 
findings suggested that even if an individual wishes to be tolerant of a person with a 
mental illness, this desire may be insufficient to prevent discrimination. They found 
that individuals unconsciously evaluated people with mental illness negatively, and 
their results suggested that bias against mental illness is evident on both an implicit 
and explicit level, across a variety of stereotype domains, and on the part of both 
mentally healthy and clinically diagnosed populations. Thus, the implicit biases 
show that even desiring to be tolerant or feeling conscious positive evaluations of 
people with mental illnesses may not be sufficient to avoid discriminating against 
the stigmatised group. 
Socall and Holtgraves (1992) found that people were less willing to interact 
with a person considered to have a mental illness, as opposed to a person said to 
have a physical illness, when the behaviour of these individuals was identical. This 
suggests that the mere label of a mental health condition, regardless of how an 
individual behaves, can create bias or prejudice, resulting in discrimination. 
Discrimination related to mental illness can take a variety of forms, including 
coercion, segregation, hostile behaviours, withholding help, or avoidance (Corrigan 
et al., 2003). 
7 
Communication Accommodation Theory (Giles, Mulac, Bradac, & Johnson, 
1987) asserts that people use specific strategies to achieve their desired social 
distance from the person they are interacting with. If an individual wants to be seen 
to be similar to their interacting partner they may engage in convergence, making 
particular characteristics, such as their language, posture, gaze or speech rate, more 
similar to that of the person they are talking to. If on the other hand they want to 
distance themselves from the person they are interacting with, they may engage in 
behaviour that is contrary to that of their interacting partner (divergence). In light of 
Socall and Holtgraves findings it would be interesting to investigate whether people 
tend to engage in divergent strategies when interacting with someone said to have a 
mental illness. Moreover, in the courtroom context, where the verbal interaction of 
witness or defendant and counsel is observed and studied by jurors and judge, or by 
a magistrate, how might speech convergence or divergence be interpreted, especially 
in relation to any psychiatric condition the speakers might be suffering from and to a 
witness's credibility. 
According to attribution theory, people make judgments about the cause and 
controllability of a person's illness, and then make inferences about a person's 
responsibility for their predicament (Weiner, 1995). These judgments lead to 
emotional reactions, such as pity, or anger, which then affect the way that a person 
will react in a given situation. If an individual believes the mental health condition 
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was not caused by the person who is suffering from it, and that the illness is outside 
of the person's control, then they are unlikely to hold the person responsible for their 
predicament, and are therefore more likely to feel pity for the individual, and 
provide help or assistance if needed or possible. If, on the other hand, they believe 
that the cause of the mental illness was within the person's control, they are more 
likely to hold that individual responsible for their predicament, are likely to feel 
anger or resentment toward that person, and are therefore more likely to discriminate 
against them in some way, whether through avoidance or some form of punishment 
(Corrigan et al., 2003; Weiner, 1995). 
Consistent with attribution theory, Corrigan et al. (2003) found that when 
people viewed the onset of mental illness as being under the sufferer's control, 
people were more likely to avoid, withhold help, and endorse coercive treatment of 
someone with a mental illness. However, from this study it is still unclear how 
people in society make these judgments about the mentally ill in the absence of 
information relevant to illness onset. In Corrigan et al.'s study, participants were 
told what had caused the person's mental health condition, either a severe head 
injury (uncontrollable) or prolonged use of illegal drugs (controllable). The results 
therefore, although revealing, do not tell us much about how a person in the general 
public is likely to respond to someone with a mental illness, if unaware of what 
caused it. People often have no useful information about what has caused an 
individual's mental illness so they are left to make that judgment on their own, 
presumably relying on their own default strategies and cognitive heuristics. Results 
from a study by Bordieri and Drehmer (1986) suggest that when the cause of a 
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person's health predicament is not given (as either internal/controllable or 
external/uncontrollable) people tend to treat them just as they treat those who are 
said to have caused their own health problems. Thus, these results indicate that 
without evidence of any specific external cause, a disabled person (regardless of 
whether it is a physical disability or mental illness) will be viewed as responsible for 
their condition. 
Bordieri and Drehmer (1986) further found that people are more likely to 
hire individuals with a physical disability than a mental illness. Despite these 
findings, it is possible that the mental illness chosen for this experiment (drug 
dependency) may limit the generalisability of the results to other mental illnesses, 
such as schizophrenia or depression. Drug dependency is likely to elicit a set of 
stigmas and biases distinct from other mental health conditions. However, 
regardless of the disability type (physical or mental) the results were consistent with 
attribution theory, showing that the cause of the disability was more influential in 
decision making than the type of condition the individual had. The results of 
Bordieri and Drehmer's (1986) study showed that, regardless of the type of 
disability, when the cause of the disability was viewed as being outside of the 
sufferer's control, individuals were more likely to be hired and seen to have a 
brighter future with the company than when it was attributed to an internal cause. 
Other studies, such as that of Farina and Felner (1973), have also found that 
people with a mental illness may be disadvantaged in finding a job. The likelihood 
of someone with a mental illness finding somewhere to live may also be affected. 
Results of another investigation of landlords' willingness to rent an apartment to a 
person with a mental illness suggested that 1) the stigma of the mental illness can 
influence the decision and 2) the effect of the 'mental illness' label may be 
equivalent to that elicited by the 'criminal' label (Page, 1977). 
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The studies, although fairly consistent, were all conducted several decades 
ago. It is therefore difficult to state with confidence whether or not their results are 
consistent with the treatment of people with mental illness in today's society. 
However, research suggests that the perception that mentally ill people are violent or 
frightening has substantially increased between 1950 and 1996 (Phelan, Link, 
Stueve, & Pescosolido, 2000). The fact that this stigma has persisted across time 
suggests that the discrimination resulting from that stigmatisation may also have 
continued, and thus people with mental illnesses may well face the same difficulties 
in finding jobs and accommodation as they did in previous decades. 
We will now look at how stigma and discrimination can come into play in 
the courtroom, before discussing the implications of these for people with a mental 
illness. 
Prejudice in court 
Juror bias 
It is generally assumed that when a jury hears a case it does so without 
prejudice toward either the complainant or the defendant (Lupfer, Cohen, Bernard, 
Smalley, & Schippmann, 2001). It is held that the judicial system provides a 
platform on which persons can receive a fair trial based on the facts of the case, 
rather than interpersonal bias and prejudice. However, contrary to this assumption, 
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research suggests that there are a number of biases, including physical attractiveness 
(Abel & Watters, 2005), age (Bergeron & McKelvie, 2004), race (Cohen & 
Peterson, 1981; Hodson et al., 2005; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001 ), and gender of a 
defendant, which may influence jurors' and even judges' decisions about verdicts 
and sentencing (Lupfer et al., 2001). 
Lupfer et al. (2001) found that, in civil cases in the US, jurors' verdicts 
reflected a bias against the plaintiff. The results of this study indicated that jurors 
tend to view the plaintiffs behaviour as more motivated by harmful, hostile 
intentions and negative stereotypes than the actions of the defendant. This anti-
plaintiff bias may be a common occurrence in civil cases, as the plaintiff, by virtue 
of having initiated the complaint, may be perceived as bearing more responsibility 
for the burden of proof than the defendant. The results of Lupter et al. 's research 
also suggest that the stance that the plaintiff takes in the proceedings is viewed by 
the jurors as being based on negative characteristics of the plaintiff as a person, 
rather than a result of the situation they are in, and the role that they are assuming. 
Both the defendant's and the lawyer's race have also been found to have an 
effect on jurors' verdicts. Cohen and Peterson (1981) found that in the US 
defendants who were represented by African American lawyers were more likely to 
be found guilty than those represented by a European American lawyer. Results of a 
study by Espinoza and Willis-Esqueda (2008) in the US also revealed a relationship 
between defendant and lawyer race and sentencing. Their study not only included 
the race of the lawyer and defendant (Mexican American or European American), 
but also incorporated the defendant's socio-economic status (SES) (low or high). 
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The results suggest that bias against Mexican American defendants occurred when 
the Mexican American defendant was of low SES and represented by a Mexican 
American defence lawyer. Although there was no significant effect on the verdict, a 
significant effect was seen on length of sentence. The low SES Mexican American 
defendants were given a lengthier sentence compared with the high SES Mexican 
American defendants, and the low and high SES European American defendants. 
These results suggest that the race of both the lawyer and the defendant can 
influence a juror's sentencing, but that this is most likely to occur when a defendant 
fits within the stereotypical view of someone from that particular stigmatised group, 
and when it can be perceived that only someone from the same racial group is 
willing to represent them in court. 
Hodson et al. (2005) also found a complex relationship between defendants' 
race and juror sentence preferences. In their UK study the defendant was stated as 
being either 'white' or 'black', and mock jurors were given transcripts to read in 
which incriminating DNA evidence was either allowed or stated to be inadmissible, 
and crossed out (although it was still possible for jurors to read the information if 
they so wished). The results showed that overall, participants did not respond more 
harshly to 'black' defendants than to 'white' defendants. However, when jurors 
were told that the incriminating DNA evidence was inadmissible, and therefore 
should not be used in making their judgments about the defendant, jurors rated the 
'black' defendant as significantly more guilty than the 'white' defendant. In this 
situation the jurors also recommended a longer sentence for the 'black' defendant, 
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and viewed the defendant as more likely to re-offend. These results suggest that 
even if overt racism is diminishing in the courtroom, subtle racism may well persist. 
Race is not the only factor that can influence a jury. Nelson (2004) provides 
an overview of the studies looking into the effects of lawyer gender on jurors' 
decisions. Although the results are not always consistent, and some of the 
methodologies have limited generalisability, the available data suggest that the 
gender of the lawyer can influence a juror's verdict as a result of numerous gender-
related variables. These include stereotyped views of male and female characteristics 
and roles, relative attractiveness and dress, and the way that male and female 
lawyers are addressed by others in the courtroom. In particular, a female lawyer's 
credibility may be undermined if a judge refers to her using terms such as 'honey', 
and 'little lady' (see Nelson, 2004). Although it may be difficult to conceive how 
such remarks would be tolerated in courts today, the research presented in Nelson's 
review suggests that it still occurs, at least in the US, and that it has the potential to 
undermine a female lawyer's credibility. 
Physical attractiveness is also said to have the potential to influence a juror's 
decisions. There have been conflicting research results regarding the effect of a 
defendant's physical attractiveness on jurors' decision making, and it is possible that 
attractiveness may affect verdicts only for certain crimes. One study also looked at a 
defendant's physical attractiveness, smiling, gender and the length of sentences 
given by jurors. The results suggest that if a person is actually guilty and physically 
unattractive, they should smile, but if the person is guilty and physically attractive, 
they should not smile (Abel & Watters, 2005). Beckham, Spray, and Pietz (2007), 
on the other hand, found that attractiveness did not affect the form of punishment 
given to a defendant (life imprisonment or the death penalty). However, they did 
find that a juror's age and gender significantly influenced sentencing. The results 
showed that younger (20-40 years old) and older men (70+ years old) were less 
likely to choose the death penalty than were men of about 40-60 years, and that 
young women of about 20-40 years were more likely to sentence the defendants to 
death than were older women (40+ years). 
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The studies just discussed show that jurors can be influenced by prejudice 
and discrimination across a variety of factors. The stigma attached to, or the 
perceptions associated with, certain groups of people can influence a juror's decision 
in terms of verdict and length of sentencing. That this bias can occur across a 
variety of factors, of varying levels of stigma, suggests that some form of juror bias 
is also likely to occur when a defendant is said to have a mental illness. 
Mental lllness and the Criminal Justice System 
Research has shown that since the deinsitutionalisation of people with mental 
illness there has been an increase in the number of mentally ill people within the 
criminal justice system (V aldiserri, Carroll, & Hartl, 1986), resulting in a form of 
reinstitutionalisation or, what has been labeled the 'criminalisation' of mental illness 
(Perez, Leifman, & Estrada, 2003). Australian studies have shown that 13.5% of 
male prisoners, and 20% of female prisoners report having been previously admitted 
to a psychiatric facility. The study also found that up to 8% of males and 14% of 
females in Australian prisons have a major mental illness with psychotic features 
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(Mullen, Holmquist, & Ogloff, 2003). These statistics are alarming compared to the 
relatively low prevalence rates of such disorders in the general public. 
Studies have also demonstrated that people with mental illness tend to be 
arrested and incarcerated more often for minor offences, and receive longer 
sentences than their mentally healthy counterparts (Valdiserri et al., 1986). This 
suggests that some form of bias against people with mental illness is probably 
occurring at some point in the criminal justice process. Some pre- and post-arrest 
programs have been initiated in the US in an attempt to counter this problem (Perez 
et al., 2003). However, there is still a long way to go, and as the problem of the 
criminalisation of mental illness continues it is important to investigate whether, and 
the ways in which, people suffering from mental illness are discriminated against in 
the criminal justice system. 
The majority of research into mental illness in the court has focused on 
topics such as the insanity defence, expert testimony and whether people with 
mental illness should be put on death row. The topic of juror bias against defendants 
with mental illness for minor offences, and where the insanity defense is not applied, 
has received little attention. However, the research outlined above shows the huge 
impact that juror bias can have on verdicts and sentence length, and suggests that 
there is an increase in the number of people with mental illnesses within the criminal 
justice system, and that people with mental illnesses tend to be imprisoned for more 
minor offences. Thus, it would seem important to conduct research investigating 
whether there is any bias in the courtroom against defendants with mental illnesses. 
Also, the majority of research investigating bias in the criminal justice system, to 
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date, has focused on bias within American courtrooms. It is therefore important to 
investigate whether the results found in the US are replicable in other countries and 
cultures, such as the Australian context. 
Research Direction 
The stigma associated with, and the bias against, people with mental illness 
has been outlined in this review. Numerous studies have demonstrated that the 
stigma of mental illness can lead to discrimination in a variety of situations. 
Research results have shown that discrimination may occur in court (Abel & 
Watters, 2005; Bergeron & McKelvie, 2004; Cohen & Peterson, 1981; Hodson et 
al., 2005; Lupfer et al., 2001; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001), that bias can occur 
despite an individual's desire to be tolerant and understanding towards those with 
mental illness (Teachman et al., 2006), and that the mere label of a mental illness 
can influence the way a person is viewed, despite their behaviour (Socall & 
Holtgraves, 1992). These findings together suggest that the stigma associated with 
mental illness may result in a bias against defendants with mental illnesses. It is 
therefore recommended that future research should investigate mental illness in the 
courtroom, and whether a defendant's mental health condition affects the way that a 
jury perceives him or her, and whether this influences the verdict. 
More specifically, as research has suggested that the mere label of a mental 
illness can influence the way an individual is viewed (Socall & Holtgraves, 1992), it 
is recommended that future research investigate whether, under controlled 
conditions, a defendant said to have a mental illness is perceived and judged 
'' 
' 1 ,-
differently by jurors from a defendant without a mental illness. It would also be 
interesting to investigate whether the label of a psychiatric disorder influences the 
way jurors view shifts in defendant behaviour. Communication Accommodation 
Theory provides a theoretic framework for investigating shifts in communicative 
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behaviour between interacting partners, and would therefore be helpful in assessing 
whether changes in behaviour, which generally would be viewed as socially 
adaptive, would be viewed differently when one of the interacting partners is said to 
have a mental illness. 
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Empirical Study 
Mental illness in the courtroom: Does a psychiatric diagnosis affect perception of a 
defendant's speech dynamics on the witness stand? 
2 
Abstract 
The present study aimed to investigate prospective juror's perceptions of the dynamics 
of social interaction in a courtroom where the defendant is said to have a psychiatric 
diagnosis. The experiment adopted Communication Accommodation Theory (CAT) to 
examine the effect of lawyer and defendant's converging and diverging speech rates on 
the jurors' perception of the defendant's credibility, likeability, cooperativeness, intent 
and guilt. One-hundred and eighty-six participants were allocated to one of 18 
conditions, in which they listened to a reenactment of part of an edited court case and 
then filled in questionnaires. It was hypothesised that rapid speed of speech would act 
as a credibility cue, resulting in an increase in ratings of defendant credibility. It was 
further expected that ratings of cooperativeness and likeability would increase when the 
lawyer and defendant's speech rates converged and that ratings of cooperativeness and 
likeability would vary across convergence and divergence depending on whether the 
defendant's change in speech rate was perceived as being internally or externally 
motivated (intent). In regards to the effect of the defendant's mental health label, it was 
hypothesised that where the defendant was said to have a psychiatric diagnosis this label 
would override the effect of the speech rate manipulations. Little support was found for 
the hypotheses outlined in this study. Possible reasons for this lack of support, as well 
as suggestions for further research are outlined in the discussion. 
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Research indicates that there is an over-representation of people with psychiatric 
disorders in the criminal justice system (Munetz, Grande, & Chambers, 2001 ). There is 
also evidence that people with severe psychiatric disorders are more likely to be 
convicted of misdemeanors, and tend to be imprisoned for longer periods than their 
mentally healthy equivalents (Valdiserri, Carroll, & Hartl, 1986), based on the same 
evidence. Despite this, research into the mechanisms behind these apparent biases is 
sparse. Moreover, notwithstanding the high incidence of mental illness, it is still 
surrounded by widespread fear, misunderstanding and stigma, which is likely to affect 
the way mentally ill persons are received in court (Henderson, 2006), and the long term 
consequences for such people can be devastating. The current study therefore aimed to 
examine possible mechanisms behind this bias against defendants with psychiatric 
conditions. This is an extensive and complex topic and the present study focused on just 
one variable which may affect the way a defendant is perceived in court, namely juror 
bias in relation to language and social interaction. 
Language in social interaction has attracted research across multiple disciplines, 
including social psychology, sociology, sociolinguistics, and communication (Shepard, 
Giles, & Le Poire, 2001). Theoretical frameworks dealing with language use in social 
interactions have been developed, of which the most influential is suggested to be 
Communication Accommodation Theory (CAT). Although CAT has undergone a 
number of revisions and developments, the fundamental argument of this theory remains 
that language is used inter alia by individuals as a means to adjust the social distance 
between self and the interacting partner (Giles, Mulac, Bradac, & Johnson, 1987). 
In order to achieve this desired social distance, individuals employ specific 
strategies. One of the methods identified is the approximation strategy (Shepard et al., 
2001 ), which incorporates a number of components (convergence, divergence, 
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maintenance and complementarity). The first of these is convergence, whereby 
individuals modify their behaviour to become more like that of their interacting partner. 
Other things being equal, this will reduce social distance, and the behaviours modified 
can include linguistic, paralinguistic, and non-verbal features such as speech rate, 
utterance length and gaze (Giles et al., 1991; Shepard et al., 2001). If, on the other 
hand, an individual desired to increase social distance, between themselves and their 
interacting partner, they could use the divergence strategy (Giles et al., 1991; Shepard et 
al., 2001 ). When the maintenance strategy is employed, an individual continues in their 
usual style of communication regardless of the characteristics of their interacting 
partner, and of any accommodation attempts the partner may be engaging in (Shepard et 
al., 2001 ). Finally, the complementarity strategy occurs when both interacting partners 
simultaneously diverge from each other by accentuating mutually valued differences 
between themselves, such as males and females speaking in more masculine and 
feminine tones, respectively, when conversing in mixed, as opposed to same-sex dyads 
(Hogg, 1985). 
These approximation strategies have been investigated in various contexts. 
Research has investigated communication in intercultural (Ayoko, Hartel & Callan, 
2002) and bilingual settings (e.g. Gallois & Callan, 1991) as well as looking at the 
strategies used between generations (e.g. McCann & Giles, 2006), and genders (Hogg, 
1985). Few researchers have investigated these strategies within the context of 
courtroom proceedings (Aronsson, Jonsson, & Linell, 1987; Gnisci, 2005; Gnisci & 
Bakeman, 2007; Linell, 1991; Lind & O'Barr, 1976). Other research in applied contexts 
includes a novel experiment examining the approximation strategies used when leaving 
messages on answering machines (Buzzanell, Burrell, Stafford, & Berkowitz, 1996). 
The speech and non-verbal features studied have also varied, from vocabulary and 
5 
information density (Aronsson et al., 1987), the effect of voice quality, face and body 
(O'Sullivan, Ekman, Friesen, & Scherer, 1985), and various characteristics of question-
answer exchanges (Gnisci, 2005). It can be seen that CAT has endured, as it still 
features prominently in research, and with the contexts of its application still expanding, 
three decades after its inception (Gallois, Ogay, & Giles, 2005). Thus, CAT, despite 
minor revisions, has stood up to extensive testing across various contexts and 
applications and provides an appropriate framework for research on juror bias. 
An early study on speech in the courtroom investigated speed of speech, finding 
that rapid speech increased persuasion, although it did not make use of CAT (Miller, 
Maruyama, Beaber, & Valone, 1975). The topic has since been neglected. The present 
study therefore adopted CAT to examine the effects of converging and diverging speech 
rates within the courtroom setting. 
Research has yet to investigate whether a juror's view of a defendant's 
interaction with a lawyer is affected by the mere label of a psychiatric disorder. It is 
therefore unclear whether shifts in speech which, under normal circumstances could be 
viewed as socially adaptive, are viewed differently when one of the interacting partners 
is a defendant in court and said to have a psychiatric disorder. The present study 
focused on one possible shift in speech, namely speed, and manipulated it to investigate 
its effects on prospective jurors' ratings of the perceived cooperativeness, likeability, 
credibility, intent and guilt of the defendant, for both mentally ill and healthy 
defendants. 
Miller et al (1975) found that rapid speech acts as a credibility cue and thereby 
increases persuasiveness. It was therefore hypothesised that when a defendant's speech 
increases in speed, so will their credibility. As convergence has been found to result in 
positive evaluations of a person's friendliness and warmth (Coupland, 1985), it was 
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hypothesised that when the defendant's speed of speech converges with that of the 
prosecuting lawyer, whether at the slow or fast rates, prospective jurors will view the 
defendant as being more cooperative and likeable. Drawing on attribution theory 
(Kelley, 1967), it was further hypothesised that when participants view a defendant's 
convergence as an attempt to break down barriers (internal process), intent will be 
viewed as more positive than when it is attributed to situational pressures (external 
process); conversely, divergence that is believed to be a result of situational pressure is 
likely to be viewed more positively than when it is attributed to internal processes, such 
as a lack of effort or cooperation (Simard, Taylor, & Giles, 1976). 
In order to investigate whether the specific psychiatric diagnosis affects the 
perception of a defendant in relation to their speech, the present study' s design 
incorporated two contrasting psychiatric diagnoses (Bipolar Disorder and Post-traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD)) and a non-psychiatric condition (Diabetes). Where the 
defendant was given the label of 'Bipolar Disorder', it could be expected that fast 
speech would be viewed as a manifestation of manic behaviour, while slow speech 
might be seen as a sign of depression (as the participants' level of understanding of 
Bipolar disorder would be likely to differ, the symptoms that the defendant experienced 
could be indicated by the defence lawyer during the court case). 
It was also possible that regardless of how the defendant's speech was 
perceived, the mere label of a psychiatric disorder would influence the results. Labeling 
theory (Socall & Holtgraves, 1992) asserts that the label of a psychiatric condition can 
affect the way a person is perceived, whatever their behaviour. It was therefore 
hypothesised that the presence of Bipolar Disorder would override that of the speech 
rate, such that ratings of credibility would not increase with speed of speech. In regard 
to the PTSD condition, an even greater increase in credibility with speed of speech 
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might be expected than for the mentally healthy condition (Diabetes), if this defendant 
were viewed as having to overcome their trauma, and the associated symptoms, in order 
to be able to interact competently with the lawyer. However, it is also possible that the 
label and stigma of a mental health problem, regardless of what it is, is so strong that it 
again overrides any speech rate manipulations. If so, then no credibility effect would be 
expected. A post-experimental questionnaire was used to explore these possibilities. 
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Method 
Design 
A between-subjects design was employed to investigate the effect of 
defendant speech rate (slow, normal, fast), lawyer speech rate (slow, fast) and 
defendant health condition (Bipolar Disorder, PTSD, Diabetes) on perception of 
defendant cooperativeness, likeability, credibility, intent and guilt. The two speech 
rate variables (lawyer and defendant), in combination, manipulate 
convergence/divergence in speech speed. Manipulation checks were designed to 
assess the effectiveness of the independent variables. 
Participants 
One hundred and eighty-six participants ( 49 male, 134 female, 3 
unidentified), ranging from 18 to 77 years of age (M = 24.64, SD = 10.3), were 
recruited for the present study. They were primarily first-year psychology students 
from throughout Tasmania, participating for course credit. Participants were 
randomly allocated to experimental conditions, and took part in a small group of up 
to 10 people. 
Materials 
The initial audio-recording of the edited court case (script in Appendix A) 
was carried out at the University of Tasmania Conservatorium of Music by a Multi-
media student skilled in audio-production. The speech rates of the prosecution 
lawyer and defendant (both male) were later manipulated by him using the Cubase 
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audio-production software, adjusting speech rates by+/- 20% for fast and slow 
speech, respectively. The case presented was a drugs case in which the defendant 
was charged with possession with intent. In court the defendant admitted to having 
grown and used cannabis over a long period of time (20-25 years). However, he 
denied ever selling the cannabis. 
The recording (script in Appendix A5) included only the section of the court 
case where the defendant was on the witness stand. It consisted of three segments: 
1) the initial examination of the defendant by the defence lawyer. During this phase 
the defence lawyer asked the defendant questions related to his health condition 
(Bipolar Disorder, PTSD or Diabetes), thereby providing information about the 
conditions as well as the symptoms that the defendant experienced. There were no 
speech rate manipulations during this section, and thereby provided the baseline for 
the defendant's speed of speech. 2) The cross-examination by the prosecution 
lawyer. In this section the prosecuting lawyer and defendant's speech rates were 
manipulated so that the defendant either converged with the lawyer's speech rate, 
diverged from it, or maintained his previous speed. 3) The re-examination of the 
defendant by the defence lawyer. This section allowed the lawyer's and defendant's 
speech rates to return to baseline. 
Colleagues and family members were recruited to play the parts of the 
lawyers, defendant, judge and judge's associate. The different versions of the audio-
recording were transferred to compact disk and presented to participants via a laptop 
computer and loudspeakers. Questionnaires (provided in Appendix A) assessing the 
dependent variables and manipulation checks were used (with participants primarily 
indicating ratings on 9-point Likert scales). The questionnaires also asked 
participants to provide written explanations for some of their answers and to 
complete a mood scale (using 9-point Likert scale), although this data was not 
formally analysed in the present study. 
Procedure 
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At the start of the experimental session participants were given an 
information sheet and consent form. After informed consent was given, they were 
introduced to the court case. It was explained that they would hear a re-enactment 
of part of a real but edited court case in which the defendant would be testifying on 
his own behalf. The participants then listened to one of the recordings (conditions). 
After hearing the case once they were informed that they would be rating the 
defendant on his cooperativeness, likeability, credibility and innocence/guilt. 
Participants were then given the questionnaire that measured these qualities, and 
were told that the defendant would be experiencing the greatest pressure during 
cross-examination, and that the qualities measured on the questionnaire were 
therefore most likely to be tested during that time. However, participants were told 
to make their ratings based on the defendant's overall performance. They were also 
asked to familiarise themselves with the questionnaire, but not to fill it out until after 
they had heard the recording twice. They then listened to the case again (the same 
experimental condition as before) before completing the first questionnaire. After 
all participants had completed the first questionnaire they were given the second 
questionnaire, which included ratings of the defendant's intent, manipulations 
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checks, and a defendant mood rating scale. When these were completed participants 
were debriefed. 
Results 
The frequency of guilt ratings were calculated, as were the mean frequencies 
of guilty verdicts elicited for each independent variable, as displayed in Table 1. 
The means displayed here are only for the main effects, more detailed means are 
presented in Appendix B. 
Table 1 
Frequency of Guilt verdict across all conditions 
Bipolar PTSD Diabetes Def.speech overall mean% 
Lawyer Slow Fast Slow Fast Slow Fast guilty verdicts 
Defendant 
Slow 30% 20% 80% 20% 40% 40% 38% 
Norm 20% 20% 40% 30% 20% 60% 32% 
Fast 25%* 30% 50% 50% 50% 40% 41% 
Lawyer speech overall mean % guilty verdicts: 39% 34% 
Health overall mean%: 24% 45% 42% 
*The number of participants in this cell was 16. All other cells had 10 participants. 
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Means and standard deviations were also calculated for ratings of 
cooperativeness, likeability and credibility (rated on a 9-point likert scale, where 1 is 
uncooperative, and 9 is cooperative etc) across all independent variables. The 
results are presented in Table 2, 3 and 4. The means suggest that there were no real 
differences in ratings of the defendant's cooperativeness, likeability and credibility 
across the independent variables (lawyer speed of speech, defendant speed of speech 
and health conditions). 
Table 2 
Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) for ratings of Cooperativeness across 
Lawyer speech rate, Defendant speech rate and Health 
IVs M SD N 
Lawyer Speech 
Fast 7.75 1.08 89 
Slow 7.41 1.44 97 
Def. Speech 
Fast 7.80 1.08 66 
Norm 7.53 1.33 60 
Slow 7.58 1.29 60 
Health 
Bipolar 7.80 1.13 66 
PTSD 7.57 1.32 60 
Diabetes 7.33 1.39 60 
Table 3 
Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) for ratings of Likeability across Lawyer 
speech rate, Defendant speech rate and Health 
IVs M SD N 
Lawyer Speech 
Fast 5.81 1.80 89 
Slow 5.43 1.88 97 
Def. Speech 
Fast 5.73 1.97 66 
Norm 5.63 1.82 60 
Slow 5.56 1.85 60 
Health 
Bipolar 5.76 1.56 66 
PTSD 5.17 2.03 60 
Diabetes 5.75 1.93 60 
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Table 4 
Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) for ratings of Credibility across Lawyer 
speech rate, Defendant speech rate and Health 
IVs M SD N 
Lawyer Speech 
Fast 5.57 1.86 89 
Slow 5.32 1.95 97 
Def. Speech 
Fast 5.65 2.12 66 
Norm 5.45 1.70 60 
Slow 5.44 1.91 60 
Health 
Bipolar 6.05 1.67 66 
PTSD 5.12 2.10 60 
Diabetes 5.10 1.81 60 
14 
The frequency with which the defendant's change in speech rate was viewed 
as internally or externally motivated was calculated (frequency and percent 
displayed in Table 5). Where rating of internality and externality were identical, the 
defendant's motivational intent is described as 'balanced'. The means were also 
calculated for ratings of cooperativeness and likeability across levels of intent 
(internal, external, balanced). The means (displayed in Table 5) show no real 
difference across levels for either cooperativeness or likeability. 
Table 5 
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Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD for ratings of Cooperatives and Likeability 
across Defendant Intent (Internal, External, Balanced) 
Intent M SD Frequency Percent 
Internal 28 22.2 
Coop 7.68 1.16 
Like 5.32 2.07 
External 71 56.3 
Coop 7.48 1.26 
Like 5.63 1.88 
Balanced 27 21.4 
Coop 7.81 1.42 
Like 6.19 1.69 
Effect of Health and Lawyer and Defendant speech rates on cooperativeness, 
likeability and credibility 
A between-groups multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was 
performed to investigate the effects of health, and lawyer and defendant speech rates 
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on perceived levels of defendant's cooperativeness, likeability and credibility. 
There was a statistically significant interaction between health and lawyer speech 
rate, F (6, 332) = 2.86,p = .01. The results for the dependent variables were then 
considered separately, with results showing significant interaction between health 
and lawyer speech across all three dependent variables; cooperativeness, F (2, 168) 
= 3.06,p = .049, likeability, F (2, 168) = 4.70,p = .01, and credibility, F (2, 168) = 
7.17,p =.001. 
An inspection of the mean scores indicated that while likeability ratings 
increased across health conditions (Bipolar disorder M= 5.55, Diabetes M= 5.90, 
PTSD M = 5. 97) when the lawyer's speech rate was fast, the ratings of likeability 
decreased when the lawyer's speech rate was slow (Bipolar disorder M= 5.92, 
Diabetes M= 5.60, PTSD M= 4.37). The results also indicated that while ratings of 
credibility and cooperativeness decreased across health conditions when the 
lawyer's speech was slow (credibility: Bipolar disorder M= 6.24, Diabetes M= 
5.27, PTSD M= 4.23; cooperativeness: Bipolar disorder M= 7.80, Diabetes M= 
7.23, PTSD M= 7.07), ratings of credibility and cooperativeness were higher for 
Bipolar disorder (credibility: M= 5.79, cooperativeness: M = 7.75) and PTSD 
(credibility: M = 6.00, cooperativeness: M = 8.067) than Diabetes (credibility: M = 
4.93, cooperativeness: M= 7.43) when the lawyer's speech rate was fast. 
The MANOV A also indicated a statistically significant main effect for health 
condition, F (6, 332) = 3.14,p = .005. When the results for the dependent variables 
were considered separately, the only difference to reach statistical significance was 
credibility, F (2, 168) = 5.23,p= .006. Post-hoe analysis using Tukey HSD revealed 
that ratings of credibility were significantly higher for defendants with Bipolar 
disorder than both Diabetes,p = .01 and PTSD,p = .01. This main effect can be 
accounted for by the health x lawyer speech interaction. 
Convergence and Divergence 
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To ensure that the convergence and divergence manipulations were valid 
(i.e., speeding and slowing the speech by 20% actually led to convergence and 
divergence of speech rates), the lawyer and defendant's words per minute (wpm), at 
the normal speech rate, were compared. It was found that the prosecuting lawyer 
spoke an average of 165wpm, and the defendant 150wpm. The speech rate 
manipulations were therefore considered to be valid, as the initial rates of speech (at 
the normal rate), before manipulation, did not notably differ. 
Taking account of the specific direction of shifts in the defendant's speech 
rate in relation to the prosecuting lawyer's speech rate, a multivariate analysis of 
variance (MANOV A) was conducted to explore the effect of convergence 
(defendant's speech rate shifting to be more like the lawyer's) and divergence 
(defendant's speech rate changing to be more different from the lawyer's) on ratings 
of defendant cooperativeness and likeability, with the results indicating no 
significant effects, F (2, 123) = .058,p = .94. 
Intent 
Two MANOVAs were performed to investigate the effect of intent on ratings 
of defendant cooperativeness and likeability. Intent was broken into three 
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categories: internal, external and balanced (participants rated defendant as equally 
internally and externally motivated). One MANOV A looked at any differences in 
ratings of cooperativeness and likeability when the lawyer's and defendant's speech 
rates converged (at either the fast or slow rate), and the other explored any 
differences in ratings when the lawyer and defendant's speech rates diverged 
(incorporating all lawyer fast/defendant slow and lawyer slow/defendant fast 
conditions). The results indicated no significant differences in ratings of 
cooperativeness, F (2, 57) = .22,p = .80, or likeability, F (2, 57) = .29,p = .74, 
whether the participant viewed the defendant's convergence as internally, externally 
or equally internally and externally motivated. 
Similarly, the results showed no significant differences in ratings of 
cooperativeness, F (2, 63) = 1.87, p = .16, or likeability, F (2, 63) = 1.48, p = .23, 
when the defendant's divergence was viewed as internally, externally, or equally 
internally and externally motivated. 
Innocence/Guilt 
A hierarchical loglinear analysis was conducted to determine a model that 
best fitted the verdict data, which took the form of frequencies. This analysis 
incorporated the health conditions, lawyer and defendant's speech rates and verdict 
(guilty/innocent) data. 
All higher order effects were deleted from the model without any significant 
loss of fit, leaving only one effect that when deleted led to a significant loss of fit, 
namely health*verdict (innocent/guilty), Cx2 = 7.052,p = .029). Simple chi-square 
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analyses were then conducted to further investigate this effect. Chi-square results 
revealed that a defendant said to have Bipolar Disorder was significantly more likely 
to be given the verdict of not guilty, compared to one withPTSD Ct= 6.02,p = 
.014) or Diabetes et= 4.35,p = .04). 
Manipulation Checks 
A MANOVA was conducted to investigate whether the experimental 
manipulations (defendant's health condition and speed of speech) were noticed by 
participants. On the second questionnaires (Appendix A) participants were asked to 
indicate (on a 9-point Likert scale) "how much the defendant's speed of speech 
varied during the trial, if at all" and also "to what degree they viewed the defendant 
as having a mental health condition". Analysis of these ratings revealed no 
significant results for mental/health conditions, F (10, 328) = 1.16, p = .32 or speed 
of speech, F (10, 328) = .99,p = .45, suggesting not only that the participants were 
unaware of the experimental manipulations, but that they did not understand the 
difference between a mental and physical health condition. 
Discussion 
The over-representation of people with psychiatric disorders within the 
criminal justice system (Munetz, Grande, & Chambers, 2001 ), along with the 
widespread fear and stigma associated with mental illness (Henderson, 2006) raises 
questions about whether a bias exists against people with psychiatric disorders 
within the court system. The present study investigated this possibility, focusing 
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specifically on any juror bias against defendants with psychiatric disorders. 
Drawing on Communication Accommodation Theory (CAT), the present study 
manipulated lawyer and defendant speed of speech to investigate the effects on 
prospective jurors' ratings of the perceived cooperativeness, likeability, credibility, 
intent and guilt of the defendant. The ratings given on these measures were 
compared in regard to both the speech rate manipulations and the health condition 
ascribed to the defendant (being said to have a psychiatric disorder (Bipolar 
Disorder or PTSD), or to be physically unhealthy (Diabetes)). 
Influence of speed of speech on ratings of defendants' credibility 
Based on previous research into speech rates and perceptions of credibility 
(Miller et al., 1975), it was anticipated that the defendant's credibility would 
increase along with their speech rate. The present results did not support this 
hypothesis, with the findings suggesting that the speed of the defendant's speech had 
no effect on his credibility rating. It is unclear why the previously published 
findings were not confirmed. It is possible that the manipulation of the speech rates 
was not great enough to reveal the expected effect, but pre-testing of speech rate 
manipulations indicated that further deviation from the normal speed of speech (i.e., 
more than +/-20%) sounded unnatural, and was therefore considered inappropriate 
for the current study. Alternatively, presuming that speech rate would, under normal 
circumstances, affect the credibility of a defendant, it is possible that in the present 
case there were other, more influential factors that affected ratings of credibility, 
thereby swamping any speech rate effect. 
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In light of this possibility, hypotheses regarding the influence of the 
defendant's health condition on ratings of credibility were also provided. 
Specifically, it was hypothesised that the presence of Bipolar Disorder would 
override the influence of the speech rate manipulation, such that ratings of 
credibility would not increase with speed of speech. This prediction seems 
consistent with the current results, as there was no significant main effect for 
defendant speed of speech or interaction between health condition and defendant 
speed of speech for ratings of credibility. This hypothesis may have been upheld, 
though, the reason remains unclear. It was expected that when the defendant was 
given the label of 'Bipolar Disorder' fast speech would be viewed as a manifestation 
of manic behaviour, while slow speech would be seen as a sign of depression, and 
that this would override the speed of speech manipulation. Whether the speech 
manipulations were processed by participants in such a manner is unknown. 
Hypotheses regarding the influence of PTSD on credibility ratings were also framed. 
Due to the nature of PTSD it was difficult to predict for certain whether the 
psychiatric label or the symptoms of the disorder itself would have a greater affect 
on ratings of credibility. Two alternative hypotheses, based on different lines of 
reasoning, were therefore presented. On the one hand, there was the possibility of 
finding an even greater increase in credibility with speed of speech for PTSD than 
for Diabetes, if participants saw the defendant with PTSD as having to overcome 
their disorder, or symptoms, in order to interact in such a manner. Alternatively, 
there was also the possibility that the stigma of the mental illness would be such that 
it would override any speech rate manipulations. The analysis revealed no 
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significant increase in credibility with speed of speech, suggesting that the 
psychiatric label influenced this result. However, as no increase in credibility with 
speed of speech was found for any health condition, including Diabetes (where it 
was expected), no such conclusion can confidently be drawn. It therefore appears 
that the psychiatric labels of Bipolar Disorder and PTSD had no effect on these 
ratings. 
Effect of health condition on credibility ratings 
The present study's results revealed a main effect for health condition on 
ratings of defendant credibility. The results specifically showed that when said to 
have Bipolar Disorder the defendant was seen as significantly more credible than 
those said to have PTSD or Diabetes. This finding is in line with the data showing 
that when said to have Bipolar Disorder he was rated as being 'not guilty' 
significantly more often than when said to have PTSD or Diabetes. These findings, 
however, are not in line with what was hypothesised. Based on labeling theory 
(Socall & Holtgraves, 1992), it was expected that a defendant said to have a 
psychiatric disorder would be viewed as less credible (and more guilty) than one 
said to be mentally healthy. It is possible that the court case presented in the current 
study may have had a nullifying impact on the results for a couple of unforeseen 
reasons. Firstly, through the lawyer's questioning of the defendant.it was made clear 
that the defendant was poorly educated. It is therefore possible that participants may 
have viewed him in a negative light purely based on his lack of academic 
achievement (having only completed 6th grade, and having had to repeat it 3 times). 
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Indeed, qualitative (verbal) feedback from participants suggested that many of them 
viewed him as possessing some kind of learning or psychiatric disorder, based on his 
academic skills. Secondly, the trial used in the current study was a drugs case, with 
the defendant admitting to having used cannabis from a young age (around 15 years 
old), and to have grown it for "in excess of20-25 years". This also may have 
influenced the jurors' perception of the defendant and interfered with the expected 
results, as participants could have viewed the defendant, regardless of the 
manipulations carried out, as having a psychiatric diagnosis of substance use, abuse 
or dependence, which could have confounded the results. Thirdly, the psychiatric 
disorders chosen in this study may have influenced the results. The stigma 
associated with Bipolar Disorder and PTSD may not be as great as that associated 
with a diagnosis of Schizophrenia or psychotic disorders. It would be interesting for 
future research to investigate whether there is in fact a difference in the way 
defendants labeled with a range of different psychiatric disorders (of varying degrees 
of severity) are perceived by prospective jurors. 
It is also possible that, despite a concerted effort to make the health condition 
of the defendant explicit (whether Bipolar Disorder, PTSD or Diabetes), the health 
manipulations in the current study were not vigorous enough to have any significant 
impact on the participant. The mental health condition was not used in the trial as 
part of the defence case. It therefore did not take centre stage, and so may have been 
overlooked or disregarded by participants. As it was not being used as a defence, 
participants may have also viewed the information given about the defendant's 
condition as irrelevant. However, there is another possible explanation for the lack 
of influence of the health condition on results. In qualitative feedback participants 
specified that they did not see direct evidence in his behaviour of the condition the 
defendant was said to have, and therefore did not believe that the defendant was 
really affected by the disorder while on the witness stand. This explanation 
contradicts expectations based on labeling theory, and therefore warrants further 
investigation in future research. 
Effect of convergence and divergence on perception of defendant 
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In regard to the convergence and divergence of the lawyer and defendant's 
speech rates, it was hypothesised that when the defendant's and prosecuting lawyer's 
speed of speech converged, whether at the slow or fast rates, the perceived level of 
defendant cooperativeness and likeability would increase. This expectation was 
based on findings showing that, ceteris paribus, convergence results in positive 
evaluations of a person's friendliness and warmth (Coupland, 1985). Contrary to 
expectations, no significant difference was found in ratings of either cooperativeness 
or likeability when comparing convergence with divergence. 
Based on attribution theory (Kelley, 1967) it was further anticipated that 
when participants viewed the defendant's convergence as an attempt to break down 
barriers (internal motivation), the defendant's intent would be viewed as more 
positive (measured by higher ratings on cooperativeness and likeability) than when it 
is attributed to situational pressures (external motivation). Conversely, it was 
expected that divergence viewed as a result of situational pressures would be 
regarded more positively than that attributed to internal processes, such as a lack of 
effort or cooperation (Simard, Taylor, & Giles, 1976). These hypotheses were not 
supported by the current results. No significant differences in ratings of 
cooperativeness or likeability were found across ratings of motivational intent 
(internal, external, balanced). Once again, it is possible that the speech 
manipulations were not great enough to elicit the expected results, or that other 
factors, related to the defendant's health condition, or to the case more generally 
(such as the defendant's academic skills or drug use), influenced the results. It is 
also possible that the participants did not completely understand what they were 
being asked to do when required to rate the defendant's motivational intent. 
Limitations of the present study 
The current study presented a number of limitations. As has been 
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mentioned, the court case used in this study, being a drugs case, may have 
confounded the effect of the mental health manipulation. The health condition 
manipulations may also have not been rigorous enough to elicit significant results. 
Also, the majority of participants used in the current research were first-year 
psychology students, which may limit the generalisability of the results. The 
population sampled is not necessarily representative of either the general public, or a 
prospective jury. First-year psychology students are likely to differ from the general 
public in age, sex distribution, intelligence and knowledge of mental health 
conditions. If their knowledge of mental illness is greater than that of the general 
public this may result in them being more sympathetic towards people with 
psychiatric disorders, and less likely to judge such a person harshly. The contrived 
experimental situation may also act as a limitation, as prospective jurors may 
respond differently to the same information when presented in a courtroom where 
their responses are seen to be of greater import. Despite the limitations of the 
present study, it has presented an initial investigation into some of the possible 
factors influencing the over-representation of people with psychiatric disorders 
within the criminal justice system. 
Directions for fature research 
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The present findings indicate that the role oflabeling theory warrants further 
research. Particularly, it seems important to investigate, in a more controlled 
manner, whether the label of a psychiatric condition affects the way a defendant is 
viewed and judged by a jury. It would also be interesting to vary both the type of 
psychiatric label given to the defendant and the severity of the crime to see whether 
these factors affect the verdict. 
The over-representation of people with psychiatric disorders within the 
criminal justice system is an extensive and complex topic which warrants further 
investigation. The present study aimed simply to initiate such research by focusing 
on one variable which could affect the way a defendant is perceived in court, 
concentrating on juror bias in relation to language and social interaction. Little 
support was found for any of the hypotheses tested in this study. That does not 
mean that either the project itself or the research topic is without merit. It does, 
rather, indicate that this research area is yet to be fully understood, and therefore 
requires further exploration. 
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Appendix 2 Information Sheet 
Private Bag 30 Hobart 
Tasmania Australia 7001 
Telephone (03) 6226 2237 
Fax (03) 6226 2883 
secretary@psychol.utas.edu .au 
www.utas.edu.au/psychol 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
SOCIAL SCIENCE/ HUMANITITES RESEARCH 
Observing the defendant in the witness box 
Chief inves tigators: Mr. Peter Ball 
Dr. N enagh Kemp 
Master's student: Anastasia Stossich 
Invitation 
You are invited to participate in a research study into the perception of a 
defendant in the witness stand. This study is being undertaken as part of 
the requirement for a Masters degree in psychology. 
1. 'What is the purpose of this study?' 
The purpose is to investigate how a defendant's communication skills and 
emotional state are perceived when testifying in the witness box. 
2. 'Why have I been invited to participate in this study?' 
You are eligible to participate in this study if you are over 18 years of age. 
4. 'What does this study involve?' 
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Participants will be asked to listen to a recording of part of a courtroom trial, 
and then to fill in some questionnaires about it. It is anticipated that the 
session will take no more than an hour. 
It is important that you understand that your involvement is this study is 
voluntary. While we would be pleased to have you participate, we respect 
your right to decline. There will be no consequences to you if you decide not 
to participate, and this will not affect your treatment I service. No 
information is required from you which you could identify you as an 
individual, and if you decide to discontinue participation at any time, you 
may do so without providing an explanation. You may also withdraw your 
UTA'. 
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data at anytime before handing your sheets to the experimenter. All 
information will be treated in a confidential manner, and your name will not 
be used in any publication arising out of the research. All of the research will 
be kept in lockable storage at the University of Tasmania School of 
Psychology for a period of at least five years, and will be deslroyed when no 
longer of scientific use. 
5. Are there any possible risks from participation in this study? 
There are no specific risks anticipated with participation in this study. 
However, if you find that you are becoming distressed you will be able to 
receive support from a counsellor at no expense to you. 
6. What if I have questions about this research? 
If you would like to discuss any aspect of this study please feel free to 
contact either Anastasia Stossich on ph 62293184 or Peter Ball on ph 
62391265. Either of us would be happy to discuss any aspect of the research 
with you. Once we have analysed the information we will be making 
available a summary of our findings. You are welcome to contact us again 
at that time to discuss any issue relating to the research study. 
This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Science Human 
Research Ethics Committee. If you have concerns or complaints about the 
conduct of this study should contact the Executive Officer of the HREC 
(Tasmania) Network on (03) 6226 7479 or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au. 
The Executive Officer is the person nominated to receive complaints from 
research participants. You will need to quote H 10194. 
Thank you for taking the time to consider this study. 
If you wish to take part in it, please sign the attached consent form. 
This information sheet is for you to keep. 
Appendix 2 Consent Form 
CONSENT FORM 
Private Bag 30 Hobart 
Tasmania Australia 7001 
Telephone (03) 6226 2237 
Fax (03) 6226 2883 
secretarv@psychol.utas.edu.au 
www.utas.edu.au/psychol 
Observing the defendant in the witness box 
1. I have read and understood the 'Information Sheet' for this project. 
2. The nature and possible effects of the study have been explained to me. 
3. I understand that the study involves a session not exceeding one hour, in 
which I will be asked to listen to a recording of a courtroom trial, and then fill 
in a questionnaire. 
4. I understand that participation involves no anticipated risks. 
5. I understand that all research data will be securely stored on the University of 
Tasmania premises for at least five years, and will be destroyed when no 
longer required. 
6. Any questions that I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. 
7. I agree that research data gathered from me for the study may be published 
provided that I will not be identified as a participant. 
8. I understand that the researchers will maintain my identity confidential and 
that any information I supply to the researcher(s) will be used only for the 
purposes of the research. 
9. I agree to participate in this investigation and understand that I may 
withdraw at any time without any effect, and if I so wish, may request that 
any data I have supplied to date be withdrawn from the research. 
Name of Participant: 
Signature: Date: 
Statement by Investigator 
D I have explained the project & the implications of participation in it to this volunteer and I believe that the consent is informed and that 
he/she understands the implications of participation 
UTA'. 
If the Investigator has not had an opportunity to talk to participants prior to 
them participating, the following must be ticked. 
D The participant has received the Information Sheet where my details have been provided so participants have the opportunity to contact 
me prior to consenting to participate in this project. 
Name of 
Investigator 
Signature of 
Investigator 
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Name of investigator ___________________________ _ 
Signature of investigator ______________ _ Date 
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Appendix 3 Questionnaire 1 
Observing the defendant in the witness box 
Age: __ _ 
Gender: M/F 
Questionnaire 1. Ph no. (last 4 digits): __ _ 
Please rate the defendant on the following: 
Uncooperative Cooperative 
D D D D D D D D D 
Unlikeable Likeable 
D D D D D D D D D 
Not credible Credible 
D D D D D D D D D 
Please indicate whether you believe the defendant is innocent or guilty of possession 
with the intent to sell. 
D Innocent 
D Guilty 
Please indicate how confident you are in this decision. 
Not at all confident Extremely confident 
D D D D 
Appendix 4 Questionnaire 4 
Observing the defendant in the witness box 
Age: __ _ 
Gender: M/F 
Questionnaire 2. Ph no. (last 4 digits): ___ _ 
1. How much did defendant's speech vary during the trial, if at all? 
Accent 
Not at all Somewhat Extremely 
D D D D D D D D D 
Speed of Speech 
Not at all Somewhat Extremely 
D D D D D D D D D 
Speech Volume 
Not at all Somewhat Extremely 
D D D D D D D D D 
2. To what extent do you think any variation in the defendant's accent was a 
response to factors external to the defendant himself, such as the way they were 
being spoken to, or treated by the lawyers? 
Not at all Somewhat Extremely 
D D D D D D D D D 
3. To what extent do you think any variation in the defendant's speed of speech 
was a response to factors external to the defendant himself, such as the way they 
were being spoken to, or treated by the lawyers? 
Not at all Somewhat Extremely 
D D D D D D D D D 
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4. To what extent do you think any variation in the defendant's speech volume was 
a response to factors external to the defendant himself, such as the way they were 
being spoken to, or treated by the lawyers? 
Not at all Somewhat Extremely 
D D D D D D D D D 
5. To what extent do you think any variation in the defendant's accent was the 
result of factors internal to the defendant himself, such as inner turmoil, peace, or 
spite? 
Not at all Somewhat Extremely 
D D D D D D D D D 
6. To what extent do you think any variation in the defendant's speed of speech 
was the result of factors internal to the defendant himself, such as inner turmoil, 
peace, or spite? 
Not at all Somewhat Extremely 
D D D D D D D D D 
7. To what extent do you think any variation in the defendant's speech volume was 
the result of factors internal to the defendant himself, such as inner turmoil, peace, or 
spite? 
Not at all Somewhat Extremely 
D D D D D D D D D 
8. Please indicate, in note form, your personal impression of the defendant's general 
state, demeanour, response to questioning, and interpersonal style while giving 
evidence. 
(Use the back of this page if you run out of space below) 
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9. Please rate how you believe the defendant was feeling during the trial: 
Drowsy Alert 
D D D D D D D D D 
Tense Relaxed 
D D D D D D D D D 
Calm Excited 
D D D D D D D D D 
Strong Feeble 
D D D D D D D D D 
Muzzy Clear-headed 
D D D D D D D D D 
Well-coordinated Clumsy 
D D D D D D D D D 
Lethargic Energetic 
D D D D D D D D D 
Contented Discontented 
D D D D D D D D D 
Troubled Tranquil 
D D D D D D D D D 
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Mentally slow Quick-witted 
D D D D D D D D D 
Attentive Dreamy 
D D D D D D D D D 
Incompetent Proficient 
D D D D D D D D D 
Happy Sad 
D D D D D D D D D 
Antagonistic Friendly 
D D D D D D D D D 
Interested Bored 
D D D D D D D D D 
Withdrawn Sociable 
D D D D D D D D D 
Depressed Elated 
D D D D D D D D D 
Self-centred Outgoing 
D D D D D D D D D 
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10. To what extent do you think the defendant's health condition may have affected 
his behaviour in the witness box? 
Not at all Somewhat Extremely 
D D D D D D D D D 
If you wish, add any brief comments you like about how it could have affected his 
behaviour. 
11. To what degree did you view the defendant as having a mental health condition? 
Not at all Somewhat Extremely 
D D D D D D D D D 
If you wish, briefly explain what lead you to this conclusion. 
Appendix 5 Script for court case 
Court Radio 
Judge Lowrie's Associate: The District Court of South Australia commencing in 
the trial of The Queen against James Rodney Matheson. 
Mr Cole: My name's Cole, and I appear for the Crown. 
Judge Lowrie: Thanks, Mr Cole. 
Miss Mealor: If it please Your Honour, my name's Mealor, and I appear for the 
accused . 
.Judge Lowrie: Thank you, Miss Mealor. 
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Woman: James Rodney Matheson, you stand charged with possessing cannabis for 
sale. Particulars of the offence alleged against you are that on the l 2th May 1996 at 
Aldinga Beach, you knowingly had cannabis, a prohibited substance, in your 
possession for the purpose of selling it to another person, the amount of cannabis 
being in excess of two kilograms. 
How say you? Are you guilty, or not guilty? 
James Matheson: Not guilty. 
Woman: Members of the jury, the accused James Rodney Matheson stands charged 
with possessing cannabis for sale, and upon this he has been arraigned, and upon his 
arraignment has pleaded not guilty and put himself upon his country, which country 
you are. 
Your charge therefore is to inquire whether he be guilty or not guilty, and harken 
unto the evidence. 
Madame Crown Prosecutor, the accused is in the charge of the jury. 
Judge Lowrie: Thank you. 
Yes, Miss Mealor. 
Miss Mealor: Thankyou your Honour. In this case the accused will be giving 
evidence as he's the only defence witness, and without further ado, I call the 
accused. 
Judge Lowrie: Thank you. Thank you, Mr Matheson ..... 
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Miss Mealor: ... and what level of education did you achieve? 
James Matheson: Sixth grade. I had to repeat sixth grade about four times. 
Miss Mealor: Right. Before we go on, without wanting to sound rude, can you read 
and write? 
James Matheson: Not at all well. I bluff me way through it and skip words 
everywhere, and if makes any sense to me, it's all right. 
Miss Mealor: Do you get unemployment benefits now, or some other sort of 
pension. 
James Matheson: No, I'm on a disability pension. 
Miss Mealor: Why do you get a disability pension? 
James Matheson: Oh, I've got lower-half back injuries, knee, upper-half back 
injuries, and my reading and writing, people just don't want to hire me. 
Section for Bipolar I Disorder condition 
Miss Mealor: It is my understanding that you are also suffering from Bipolar I 
disorder, is that correct? 
James Matheson: Yeah. I've had it for years now, it's pretty bad. 
Miss Mealor: Bipolar I disorder can be described as a condition, probably involving 
some kind of biochemical imbalance, in which a person suffers from extreme highs 
and lows in moods, is that correct? 
James Matheson: yeah, pretty much. 
Miss Mealor: Would it be correct to say that sometimes you may be too pessimistic, 
negative, and lethargic ... 
James Matheson: Mmm 
Miss Mealor: While other days you may be too optimistic, positive, and energetic? 
James Matheson: Yeah ... sometimes I feel real down and lack confidence, like you 
said, and it can go on for days, while at other times my mood can change to being 
very positive, confident, and even overexcited or agitated. Doesn't really make 
sense to me, but it's just the way that I am. 
Section for Post-traumatic Stress Disorder condition 
Miss Mealor: It is my understanding that you are also suffering from Post-
traumatic stress disorder, is that correct? 
James Matheson: Yeah. I've had it for years now, it's pretty bad. 
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Miss Mealor: Post-traumatic stress disorder can be described as a condition that 
occurs when a person experiences a traumatic event, in which they experience or 
witness actual or threatened death, serious injury or a threat to themselves or others; 
and in which the person's reaction to these events is one of fear, horror or 
helplessness. Is that correct? 
James Matheson: Yeah. 
Miss Mealor: And it affects parts of the brain that store and retrieve memories, 
which means that a person with Post-traumatic stress disorder can persistently relive 
the event in their mind, despite actively trying to avoid any reminders of the 
experience. As a result of what has happened, a person may also experience 
numbness and feel less involved in the world around them, is that correct? 
James Matheson: yeah, pretty much. I get like flashbacks in dreams, and sometimes 
during the day, and yeah, just kind of feel detached from things around me. 
Section for Diabetes condition 
Miss Mealor: It is my understanding that you are also suffering from Type 1 
diabetes, is that correct? 
James Matheson: Yeah. I've had it for years now, it's pretty bad. 
Miss Mealor: Type 1 Diabetes can be described as an autoimmune disease in which 
a person's body cannot process sugar and send it to the muscles normally, so that it 
builds up in the bloodstream and can cause damage to important organs of the body, 
is that correct? 
James Matheson: yeah, pretty much. 
Miss Mealor: There are a number of symptoms that a person suffering poorly 
controlled diabetes can experience. They include thirst, weight loss, dry, itchy skin, 
slow healing sores, loss of feeling, or tingling in the feet, blurry eyesight, excessive 
urination, as well as hunger and fatigue. Do you experience any of these? 
James Matheson: Yeah, some of them- can you see this cut on my arm ... it's 
taking ages to get better, and that's always the case. My skin is also pretty bad, and 
yeah, I have some of the others as well. 
Miss Mealor: I see. You're a, apparently a user of cannabis. 
James Matheson: Have been for many years. 
Miss Mealor: When did you start smoking cannabis? 
James Matheson: 1966. 
Miss Mealor: How old were you then? 
James Matheson: Approximately 15, 16. 
Miss Mealor: How do you smoke cannabis? 
James Matheson: Bong, cigarette papers, you name it, I smoke it. 
Miss Mealor: It would appear from the record of interview that you admit to 
growing some plants. 
James Matheson: Yes. 
Miss Mealor: And how long have you been growing cannabis? 
James Matheson: Last 20, over - in excess of 25 years, thereabouts. 
Miss Mealor: What's been the purpose of growing it? 
James Matheson: I grow it for me own personal use. 
Miss Mealor: And in the past, how have you grown it, inside the premises or 
outside. 
James Matheson: Outside. 
Miss Mealor: Have you ever grown cannabis inside? 
James Matheson: No. 
Miss Mealor: Have you ever used a hydroponic system to grow cannabis? 
James Matheson: No. 
Miss Mealor: The police found a number of packets of seeds. Have you been 
collecting seeds over a period of time? 
James Matheson: I've collected seeds for the last 20-odd years. 
46 
47 
Miss Mealor: You've seen the seeds, or the packets of seeds that have been taken by 
the police. 
James Matheson: Yes. 
Miss Mealor: You agree that those are all the seeds that were taken, or were there 
any seeds -
James Matheson: No. The seeds that I've been working on- basically, are not here. 
One in a film container should be NZ on top, which is a New Zealand variety of 
seed which are not in that display of seeds. 
Miss Mealor: And I think another one - there's paper with the writing "Trentham 
Purple"? 
James Matheson: Yes, that's one of the varieties I bred. It's not green like normal, 
it's actually deep purple. 
Miss Mealor: So is that a strain that you believe you've produced. 
James Matheson: I know its parentage, so yes. 
Miss Mealor: And this backyard, is it set up as a garden or what? 
James Matheson: Well it's sort of like a jungle more or less. 
Miss Mealor: Did you have any irrigation system set up. 
James Matheson: No. 
Miss Mealor: So what, you watered it just with a hose? 
James Matheson: I watered them with bucket, because I mix other things in a 
bucket. 
Miss Mealor: Well anyway, when you put these five seedlings, you planted them 
outside 
James Matheson: Yes. 
Miss Mealor: - do they get to a certain point where you can sex them and work out 
which are the males and which are the females? 
James Matheson: Yes. Eight to twelve weeks you can normally sex a plant. With a 
magnifying glass. 
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Miss Mealor: And what was the conclusion you came to after sexing the plants? 
James Matheson: I had three females, two males. 
Miss Mealor: So what did you do then? 
James Matheson: Nothing. Sat back and let them grow. Waited until they flowered. 
Miss Mealor: What did you do then? 
James Matheson: Well I take the pollen off the particular male I want, which is 
normally the biggest and the strongest of the two, fertilize- like your bud may be that 
round, and yea long. So you get a paper bag, put the pollen in --
Miss Mealor: So that's the pollen from the male plant? 
James Matheson: Yes. Slide it over the top, and hook it up with a rubber band and 
give it a shake. 
Miss Mealor: And what's the idea of this cross pollinating? 
James Matheson: Well ifl've got three different plants, from three different 
countries of the world, I can get them all on the one parentage. 
Miss Mealor: The one that was found outside, the policeman gave some evidence, 
what was the closest strain that could be related to? 
James Matheson: Thai Buddah. 
Miss Mealor: And he talked of seeing a silver glow on it, I think he said. 
James Matheson: That's correct, looked like a silver Christmas tree, like 
somebody'd spray painted it. 
Miss Mealor: In your record of interview, you mentioned something about 
modifying the plants and working hard to promote good growth 
James Matheson: Yes. 
Miss Mealor: And is it your understanding, that you can have some sort of 
influence on the crop that you produce? 
James Matheson: Yes. 
Miss Mealor: What sort of things do you do to promote good, healthy growth in 
your plants? 
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James Matheson: I mix up a special fertilizer, made of ingredients that are good for 
the plant, things that help produce a good quality cannabis. 
Miss Mealor: And are these ingredients that you actually dig into the ground round 
the plants? 
James Matheson: No, I actually ferment them and pour them on in a liquid form. 
Miss Mealor: Right. So you make it into like a liquid fertilizer? 
James Matheson: Yes. 
Miss Mealor: And then you pour it around the base of the plant. 
James Matheson: That's correct. 
Miss Mealor: And do you believe that that is absorbed by the root system? 
James Matheson: It does. 
Miss Mealor: Right. And it goes into the plant and can change the plant. 
James Matheson: Enhance certain characteristics of a plant. 
Miss Mealor: Right. And how long have you been doing that sort of thing? 
James Matheson: About 20-odd years. 
Miss Mealor: When you pick it, it's described as being wet, is that the suggestion? 
James Matheson: Correct. 
Miss Mealor: And then when you dry it, from your experience and from what you 
understand, does it lose weight? 
James Matheson: It does. 
Miss Mealor: What does it dry down to, using a fraction? 
James Matheson: Explain fraction. 
Miss Mealor: Well say you've got a unit of cannabis, of wet cannabis that you've 
just picked. 
James Matheson: Well ifI got a pound of it. 
Miss Mealor: What are you left with when it dries? 
James Matheson: A quarter and under. 
Miss Mealor: So it gets down to - are you saying it gets down to a quarter of the 
original weight? 
James Matheson: That's correct. And by the time you take the leaf and the stems 
out, you can be well below a quarter again. 
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Miss Mealor: Of the cannabis that was found in the spare bedroom, which was the 
whole lot from the two plants, was 4.2 kilograms. 
James Matheson: Yes. 
Miss Mealor: After drying it, would that get it down to about 1 kilogram? 
James Matheson: It would, or less. 
Miss Mealor: Right. And after removing the twigs and stalk and whatever, and leaf, 
what do you reckon you'd end up with after one kilogram of dry? 
James Matheson: At the most, probably 700 grammes. 
Miss Mealor: You've told us that this cannabis that you had harvested, plus you had 
the third plant that was growing outside -
James Matheson: Yes. 
Miss Mealor: How long's it going to last you? 
James Matheson: All year. It would do me until June next year. 
Miss Mealor: And can you say with a supply of cannabis, how much cannabis you'd 
smoke a week, say? 
James Matheson: Some weeks I may smoke an ounce, and some other weeks I may 
not even have a smoke at all. 
Miss Mealor: This cannabis that you were growing, was that for your own use? 
James Matheson: Yes. 
Miss Mealor: Did you have any intention of supplying anyone with that cannabis? 
James Matheson: No. 
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Miss Mealor: Back in May of this year, did you own a motor car? 
James Matheson: No. 
Miss Mealor: Did you have any money in the bank at all? 
James Matheson: No. 
Miss Mealor: At any time, Mr Matheson, did you intend to sell any of the cannabis 
that you harvested from any of the three plants? 
James Matheson: No. 
Miss Mealor: No other questions. 
Judge Lowrie: Thank you. 
Judge Lowrie: Yes, Mr Cole 
Mr Cole: Thank you, Your Honour. Now the cannabis the police found that was in 
the bedroom, it had only really just started drying? 
James Matheson: It wouldn't have even had a chance to get the dew off. 
Mr Cole: But you agree, don't you, Mr Matheson, that if you'd kept all that 
cannabis, and the police hadn't taken it, and you'd dried that cannabis -
James Matheson: Yes. 
Mr Cole: - chucked out the stalks -
James Matheson: Yes. 
Mr Cole: - you'd have still been left with a very large quantity of cannabis, wouldn't 
you? 
James Matheson: Probably would have had round about 700 grammes. 
Mr Cole: But you can't be sure about the weight --
James Matheson: No, nobody can. Not even the botanist who examined it can be so 
sure of what it finishes up as. 
Mr Cole: That's right. So in fact, all of that cannabis, once dried, could have been 
considerably more than 700 grammes, couldn't it? 
James Matheson: It could have been; it could have been considerably less too, on 
the other hand. 
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Mr Cole: And again, the Thai Buddah plant that was still growing, was that bigger 
or smaller than the two plants that were hanging in the bedroom? 
James Matheson: About the same size. 
Mr Cole: If that plant had stayed at your house, and you'd harvested the Thai 
Buddha plant from the backyard, and you dried it all, got rid of the stems, again 
you'd have been left with a pretty large quantity of cannabis, wouldn't you? 
James Matheson: Possibly, yes. 
Mr Cole: That would have lasted you for several years, wouldn't it? 
James Matheson: What? 
Mr Cole: Well how long do you say that cannabis would have lasted you? 
James Matheson: Twelve months, if that. Depends on how many times the police 
drop in for a visit. 
Mr Cole: You smoke cannabis with your friends and your acquaintances, don't you? 
James Matheson: Not normally. 
Mr Cole: If you were at a friend's house, and he had some cannabis --
James Matheson: Yes. 
Mr Cole: Probably offer you some, wouldn't he? 
James Matheson: Anything is possible. 
Mr Cole: And similarly, if you'd had a friend at your house, you might say, 'Got my 
bong going, have some of mine.' 
James Matheson: Oh yeah? Not a wise idea. Not if you want to keep the plants in 
the ground, you don't bother, otherwise you'll find there'll be somebody coming over 
the back fence, and you'll have no plants. 
Mr Cole: But are you saying, Mr Matheson, that you've never ever given a friend 
some of your cannabis? 
James Matheson: No, don't think so, not a wise idea. 
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Mr Cole: You're pretty proud of what you've done, and the plants that you've grown 
over the last 20 years or so, aren't you? 
James Matheson: I enjoy what I've produced. 
Mr Cole: I mean you were pretty happy to boast about what you were doing to the 
police when they interviewed you, weren't you? 
James Matheson: If you seen the state I was in, I didn't even know what I'd said to 
the police. I had to wait for the record of interview before I knew what I'd told them. 
Mr Cole: As you've already said, over the years when your supply runs out, you end 
up having to buy cannabis, don't you? 
James Matheson: Yes. 
Mr Cole: And it's expensive. 
James Matheson: Not half as expensive as the police reckon. 
Mr Cole: He said that a gramme of cannabis, cannabis head, costs between $20 and 
$40. If you just accept that for a moment, I appreciate you don't agree with it. 
James Matheson: I don't agree with it. 
Mr Cole: But that's an expensive substance to buy, isn't it? 
James Matheson: It is. Well, it's no different to a dozen bottles of beer, basically. 
Mr Cole: Well ifl'd taken all that cannabis from your bedroom, and I'd gone down 
to Hindley Street, or Rundle Street, and I'd sold it all, you'd agree I'd have made an 
awful lot of money from the cannabis in your bedroom, wouldn't I? You don't deny 
that, do you? 
James Matheson: No, I won't deny that. 
Mr Cole: And because it's expensive to buy, that's one of the reasons you grow it, 
isn't it? 
James Matheson: That's right. 
Mr Cole: Correct? 
James Matheson: Yes. 
Mr Cole: Because you don't have a whole lot of extra money to throw around, do 
you? 
James Matheson: No. 
Mr Cole: And yet you still maintain, do you, that you wouldn't have tried to sell 
even a gramme of that cannabis in your bedroom once it was dry. 
James Matheson: Well otherwise I wind up in a place like this, don't I? If I tried 
that stunt. 
Mr Cole: Just answer the question Mr Matheson, yes or no? 
James Matheson: No. 
Mr Cole: But you were quite happy to buy it, weren't you, when you needed it? 
James Matheson: Yes well I don't get in so much trouble that way. 
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Mr Cole: And yet you never thought, take an ounce or so of that cannabis, go down 
to Rundle Street, Hindley Street one day, and sell it off, make a bit of money on the 
side? 
James Matheson: No. 
Mr Cole: Never entered your mind. 
James Matheson: No. I don't want to get done for dealing, thank you. 
Mr Cole: But you're happy to be "done" for producing? 
James Matheson: Oh, I don't mind possession. 
Mr Cole: So if you'd kept all that cannabis, and you'd dried it, and a friend of yours 
had come over to you and said 'Look, I'm short, haven't got any cannabis, how about 
I buy an ounce off you?' What would you have said? 
James Matheson: No, go away. 
Mr Cole: You'd never ever ever attempted to grow plants indoors, is that right? 
James Matheson: That's right. Stuff from indoors has chemical residues, it's full of 
chemicals, so why smoke that? 
Mr Cole: You said that you'd bought the light and transformer in 1994 in 
Melbourne. 
James Matheson: Yes. 
Mr Cole: Did you ever use it to grow anything, Mr Matheson? 
James Matheson: Oh I grew a couple of lettuces. I didn't find it particularly at all 
well, because I burnt everything. 
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Mr Cole: So if that's the case, if you hadn't worked, and you burnt everything, why 
bring it all the way to South Australia with you, two years later? 
James Matheson: Because I was going to modify it. 
Mr Cole: You've told us that you don't have much money, correct? 
James Matheson: Correct. 
Mr Cole: You had a lot of cannabis at your house, didn't you? 
James Matheson: Yes. 
Mr Cole: In the months leading up to the police attending at your house, you'd 
bought cannabis on several occasions, hadn't you? 
James Matheson: Yes. 
Mr Cole: You know where you can buy cannabis, don't you? 
James Matheson: That's very easy, yes, any 15-year-old kid will sell that to you. 
Mr Cole: And yet you still maintain, do you Mr Matheson, that it never entered 
your head that you might sell even a gram of the cannabis in that bedroom once it 
was dry? 
James Matheson: I use that as medication. 
Mr Cole: No further questions. 
Ms Mealor: I would like to re-examine the witness, Your Honour. 
You said that you receive a disability pension, correct? 
James Matheson: Yeah, like I said I have some injuries that mean I get a disability 
pension every fortnight, cos it is pretty hard for me to get a job in my condition. 
Ms Mealor: Now, that pension money cannot be a real lot. 
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James Matheson: Well not compared to you lawyers, I imagine, but I have enough 
to live. I don't live an extravagant life- I don't have a car or anything, but I don't 
really need one. I always manage to get where I wanna go, and do what I wanna do. 
Ms Mealor: So, would it be right to say that, as far as you are concerned, and 
contrary to what the Crown would lead us to believe, you are not actually in 
desperate need of money? 
James Matheson: No, I'm quite happy the way I am thank you very much. I have 
everything I need. 
Ms Mealor: No further questions 
Judge Lowrie: Thank you, Mr. Matheson; you may step down from the witness 
stand. 
Judge:My remarks will be very brief to you. This man of course, when the charge 
was read out, was charged with possessing cannabis for sale, so the Crown have 
taken you through those elements they have to prove. He knowingly admitted he had 
it, it was cannabis, he admitted it was; in any event we had the forensic expert 
saying he examined both what was found in the bedroom and the plant, and it was 
the genus cannabis. It was a prohibited substance. He's charged here with a breach of 
what we call our Controlled Substances Act. I won't take you through it, but as has 
been admitted, one of those substances which is prohibited is cannabis in that Act. 
And really, why we're here is to find that (whether) he had this cannabis for the 
purpose of selling it. 
As you've heard both Counsel comment, this Act's a little bit different to a lot of 
Acts. There's an unusual situation because it has a deeming provision. And what that 
says is a person who has in his possession more than the proscribed amount of a 
prohibited substance in the absence of proof to the contrary, is deemed to have that 
in his or her possession for the purpose of sale. So what that does, of course, once 
the Crown has established that person had this quantity of this prohibited substance, 
if it's more than the proscribed amount, and the proscribed amount as you've been 
told, is 100 grammes, then the onus is on that person to prove to you that they didn't 
have it for sale. That's an onus that Mr Matheson has, and which he's undertaken, 
and the proof there, as you've heard comment upon by Counsel, it's not the same 
degree as beyond reasonable doubt, but if you accept that it's more likely than not 
that he had it for his own use, then simply he's discharged that onus. 
Really the two things here: one's the size, because the Act says I 00 grammes, 
anything more than that he's deemed to be having it for sale; and when this was 
tested, this green matter, it was over 4,000 grammes - 4 kilogrammes. So we've got 
that large quantity, plus its value. The only inference you can draw really is that he 
had it for sale. 
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But then the Defendant gave evidence. The thread of that evidence is much the same 
as his interview .. on his background, on his habitual use with this drug, his long 
experience with growing it, and indeed he's obviously got a great interest, no doubt 
it's his hobby, this plant. His own method of growing it and those very forthright 
admissions about growing it, keeping several, looking for females - and here 
admitting of course he had three plants - one still in the garden, two that he'd 
harvested, and indeed his only purpose was that was for himself and denying quite 
specifically that he was proposing to sell a gramme of it. It was as was his past, it 
was for his own use. 
But as I say if you accept his evidence, or sufficient of it to say 'Well I believe it's 
more likely than not that he had this for his own use,' bearing in mind that's what he 
maintained to the police in that long interview when clearly his faculties were not 
quite as sharp as what they were in Court, well that's sufficient to satisfy the onus. 
However if you find his evidence totally unsatisfactory, and if indeed you accept 
what the Crown have said, well then that would mean of course he hasn't discharged 
the onus. But it's a factual matter, and factual matters are for you, not for me. 
As has been mentioned to you, if you reach that stage and say 'I find the Accused not 
guilty of possessing for sale' you will then be asked the further question, 'Do you 
find the Accused guilty of simple possession?' and as his Counsel has said, on his 
own evidence, I think the foreperson would have to say, 'Yes, we do.' 
Well, ladies and gentlemen, would you mind; you'll be able to take into the Jury 
Room the exhibits to assist you in your deliberations. I ask that you retire. 
Appendix B: SPSS Output 
B 1 Descriptive statistics for ratings of dependent 
variables across independent variables 
B2 Frequency and means analysis for ratings of intent 
B3 MANOVA analysis for effects of health 
and lawyer/defendant speech rates on 
cooperativeness, likeability and credibility 
B4 MANOV A analysis for manipulation 
checks 
B5 MANOVA for intent data 
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B6 MANOV A for effect of convergence and divergence 
on ratings of cooperativeness and likeability 
B7 Hierarchical Log linear analysis on 
verdict 
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Bl Descriptive statistics for ratings of dependent variables across 
independent variables 
Means 
Coop Like Cred * Health 
Health Coop Like Cred 
B Mean 7.80 5.76 6 05 
N 66 66 66 
Std Deviation 1.126 1.560 1.668 
D Mean 7 33 5.75 5.10 
N 60 60 60 
Std Deviation 1.398 1.928 1.811 
p Mean 7.57 5.17 5.12 
N 60 60 60 
Std Deviation 1 320 2.027 2.100 
Total Mean 7.58 5.56 5.44 
N 186 186 186 
Std Deviation 1 289 1.851 1.906 
Coop Like Cred * Law speed 
Law speed Coop Like Cred 
LF Mean 7.75 5.81 5.57 
N 89 89 89 
Std Deviation 1.080 1.796 1 864 
LS Mean 7 41 5.34 5.32 
N 97 97 97 
Std Deviation 1.442 1 881 1 945 
Total Mean 7.58 5.56 544 
N 186 186 186 
Std. Deviation 1.289 1.851 1.906 
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Coop Like Cred * Def speed 
Def speed Coop Like Cred 
DF Mean 7.80 5.73 5.65 
N 66 66 66 
Std. Deviation 1 084 1 973 2.116 
DN Mean 7.53 5.63 5.45 
N 60 60 60 
Std Deviation 1.334 1.822 1.702 
DS Mean 7.37 5 32 5.20 
N 60 60 60 
Std. Dev1at1on 1.'126 1.742 1.858 
Total Mean 7.58 5.56 5.44 
N 186 186 186 
Std Deviation 1.289 1 851 1.906 
B2 Frequency and means analysis for ratings of intent 
Frequencies 
Statistics 
Conlnt(O)/Ex(1 )balanced(2) 
N Valid 
M1ssmg 
126 
0 
Conlnt(O)/Ex(1 )balanced(2) 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid 0 28 22 2 22.2 22.2 
1 71 56.3 56 3 786 
2 27 21.4 21 4 100.0 
Total 126 100.0 100.0 
Means 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Included Excluded 
N Percent N Percent 
ConvCoop * 126 100.0% 0 0% 
Conlnt(O)/Ex(1 )balanced(2) 
Convlike * 126 100.0% 0 .0% 
Con lnt(O)/Ex(1 )balanced(2) 
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Total 
N Percent 
126 100 0% 
126 100 0% 
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Report 
Conlnt(O)/Ex(1 )balanced(2) ConvCoop Convl1ke 
0 Mean 768 5.32 
N 28 28 
Std. Deviation 1.156 2.074 
1 Mean 7.48 5.63 
N 71 71 
Std. Deviation 1.263 1 884 
2 Mean 7.81 6.19 
N 27 27 
Std Deviation 1.415 1.688 
Total Mean 7.60 5.68 
N 126 126 
Std. Deviation 1.272 1 896 
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B3 MANOV A analysis for effects of health and lawyer/defendant speech 
rates on cooperativeness, likeability and credibility 
General Linear Model 
Between-Subjects Factors 
N 
Health B 66 
D 60 
p 60 
Law speed LF 89 
LS 97 
Oef speed OF 66 
ON 60 
OS 60 
Multivariate Tests0 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df S1g 
Intercept P1llai's Trace .977 2347.711 8 3 OOO 166.000 .OOO 
Wilks' Lambda .023 2347.711 8 3 OOO 166 OOO OOO 
Hotelhng's Trace 42.429 2347.711 8 3.000 166 OOO OOO 
Roy's Largest Root 42.429 2347.711 8 3.000 166 OOO OOO 
Health P1llai's Trace 107 3147 6 OOO 334 OOO 005 
Wilks' Lambda .896 31398 6.000 332 OOO .005 
Hotelling's Trace .114 3132 6 OOO 330.000 005 
Roy's Largest Root 078 4.317b 3 OOO 167.000 006 
Lawspeed P1lla1's Trace .033 1.8778 3.000 166.000 135 
Wilks' Lambda .967 1.8778 3.000 166 OOO 135 
Hotelling's Trace .034 1.8778 3.000 166.000 135 
Roy's Largest Root .034 1.8778 3 OOO 166.000 135 
Defspeed P1llai's Trace .026 .737 6 OOO 334 OOO 620 
Wilks' Lambda .974 .7368 6 OOO 332.000 621 
Hotelling's Trace .027 .735 6 OOO 330.000 .622 
Roy's Largest Root 024 1 360b 3 OOO 167 OOO 257 
Health * Lawspeed P1lla1's Trace 096 2.817 6 OOO 334 OOO 011 
Wilks' Lambda 904 2.8608 6 OOO 332 OOO .010 
Hotelling's Trace .106 2 901 6 OOO 330.000 009 
Roy's Largest Root .100 5.580b 3 OOO 167.000 001 
Health * Defspeed Pillai's Trace .068 .978 12.000 504 OOO 469 
Wilks' Lambda 932 .984 12 OOO 439 486 464 
Hotelhng's Trace .072 .989 12.000 494 OOO 459 
Roy's Largest Root .063 2.641b 4.000 168 OOO 036 
Lawspeed * Defspeed P1lla1's Trace .019 .542 6.000 334 OOO 776 
Wilks' Lambda .981 541 8 6 OOO 332.000 .777 
Hotelling's Trace .020 .540 6.000 330 OOO 778 
Roy's Largest Root .018 1.013b 3.000 167 OOO 388 
Health * Lawspeed * Defspeed P1llai's Trace .084 1.203 12.000 504.000 .277 
Wilks' Lambda .918 1.206 12 OOO 439 486 276 
Hotelling's Trace .088 1.206 12.000 494.000 275 
Roy's Largest Root 066 2.774b 4 OOO 168.000 029 
b The stat1st1c 1s an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level c Design Intercept+ Health+ Lawspeed + Defspeed +Health• Lawspeed + Health• 
Defspeed + Lawspeed • Defspeed + Health • Lawspeed • Defspeed 
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Depende 
nt Type Ill Sum of 
Source Variable Squares df Mean Square F Sig 
Corrected Model Coop 55.7248 17 3.278 2.188 006 
Like 84 617b 17 4 977 1 !123 09/ 
Cred 118.058° 17 6 945 2.107 009 
Intercept Coop 10490.735 1 10490.735 7001.541 OOO 
Like !16!17 33!1 1 !16!17 33!1 1730 864 OOO 
Cred 5377.456 1 5377.456 1631 321 OOO 
Health Coop 6 057 2 3 028 2 021 136 
Like 13 40!1 2 6.702 2 O!'i1 13/ 
Cred 34487 2 17.243 5.231 006 
Lawspeed Coop 6.767 1 6.767 4.516 035 
Like 11 98!1 1 11 98!1 3 667 0!17 
Cred 4.918 1 4.918 1.492 224 
Defspeed Coop 5642 2 2 821 1 883 155 
Like !1.6!16 2 2 828 R6!1 42:1 
Cred 5.011 2 2 505 760 469 
Health * Lawspeed Coop 9173 2 4 587 3 061 049 
Like 30 734 2 1 f) 367 4 702 010 
Cred 47.277 2 23 639 7 171 001 
Health * Defspeed Coop 14.923 4 3.731 2490 045 
Like 13 264 4 3 316 1 014 401 
Cred 12.106 4 3 026 .918 .455 
Lawspeed * Defspeed Coop .402 2 201 134 874 
Like 3 291 2 1 646 !103 60!1 
Cred 4.430 2 2.215 672 512 
Health * Lawspeed * Defspeed Coop 12 292 4 3 073 2 051 090 
Like 6 627 4 1 6!17 !107 731 
Cred 7.549 4 1 887 573 683 
Error Coop 251.722 168 1 498 
Like !149 109 16R 3 269 
Cred 553 792 168 3.296 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Depende 
nt Type Ill Sum of 
Source Variable 
Corrected Model Cooo 
Like 
Cred 
Intercept Cooo 
Like 
Cred 
Health Cooo 
I ikA 
Cred 
Lawspeed Cooo 
Like 
Cred 
Defspeed Cooo 
Like 
Cred 
Total Cooo 
Like 
Cred 
Corrected Total Cooo 
Like 
Cred 
a R Squared= 181 (Adjusted R Squared= .098) 
b. R Squared = 134 (Adjusted R Squared = .046) 
c R Squared= 176 (Adjusted R Squared= .092) 
Squares 
55.7248 
84 617b 
118.058c 
10490.735 
5657 335 
5377.456 
6.057 
13 405 
34.487 
6.767 
11 985 
4.918 
5.642 
5 656 
5.011 
10981 OOO 
6393 OOO 
6178.000 
307.446 
633 726 
671.849 
df Mean Square 
17 3 278 
17 4 977 
17 6945 
1 10490.735 
1 5657 335 
1 5377.456 
2 3.028 
2 6 702 
2 17.243 
1 6.767 
1 11 985 
1 4 918 
2 2.821 
2 2 828 
2 2.505 
186 
186 
186 
185 
185 
185 
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F S1g 
2188 006 
1 52:i Or:J2 
2107 009 
7001 541 .OOO 
17::\0 864 OOO 
1631.321 .OOO 
2 021 136 
2 051 13/ 
5 231 006 
4.516 035 
~667 057 
1.492 224 
1.883 155 
865 423 
760 469 
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Estimated Marginal Means 
1. Health 
De pen de 95% Confidence Interval 
nt 
Variable Health Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Coop B 7 776 .153 7 473 8.079 
D 7 333 158 7 021 7 645 
p 7.567 .158 7 255 7.879 
Like B 5.735 .226 5288 6.182 
D 5.750 233 5 289 6.211 
p 5.167 .233 4.706 5.627 
Cred B 6 018 .227 5.569 6.467 
D 5 100 234 4 637 5 563 
p 5.117 .234 4.654 5 579 
4. Health * Law speed 
De pen de 95% Confidence Interval 
nt Law 
Variable Health speed Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Coop B LF 7.752 228 7.303 8.201 
LS 7 800 205 7 395 8 205 
D LF 7.433 223 6.992 7 875 
LS 7 233 223 6 792 7 675 
p LF 8.067 .223 7625 8 508 
LS 7 067 .223 6625 7 508 
Like B LF 5.552 .336 4888 6 215 
LS 5 919 303 5 320 6 518 
D LF 5.900 .330 5.248 6.552 
LS 5 600 330 4 948 6 252 
p LF 5.967 .330 5.315 6 618 
LS 4.367 .330 3.715 5.018 
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4. Health * Law speed 
Depende 95% Confidence Interval 
nt Law 
Variable Health speed Mean Std Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Coop B LF 7.752 228 7.303 8.201 
LS 7 ROD 205 7 395 R 20fi 
Cred B LF 5.793 .338 5.126 6.459 
LS f) 244 30fi fi B42 B R4fi 
D LF 4.933 .331 4.279 5 588 
LS 5 2B7 331 4 B12 fi 921 
p LF 6.000 .331 5.346 6.654 
LS 4.233 .331 3.579 4 888 
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Post Hoe Tests 
Health 
Multiple Comparisons 
Tukey HSD 
Depende 95% Confidence Interval 
nt (J) Mean Difference (I-
Van able (I) Health Health J) Std Error 819. Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Coop B D .47 218 .083 -.05 99 
p 24 218 5?R -?R 75 
D B -.47 218 083 -.99 .05 
p 
- 23 223 550 - 7R 30 
p B - 24 .218 .526 - 75 28 
D .23 .223 .550 - 30 76 
Like B D .01 .322 1.000 - 76 77 
p 59 322 1R2 -17 1 35 
D B .00 322 1 OOO - 77 76 
p 58 330 184 - 20 1 3R 
p B -.59 .322 .162 -1 35 17 
D -.58 .330 .184 -1.36 20 
. 
Cred B D 95 .324 011 .18 1 71 
. p 93 324 013 1R 1 R9 
. 
D B -.95 .324 011 -1 71 -.18 
p 
- 02 331 999 - 80 77 
. p B -.93 .324 013 -1 69 -16 
D .02 .331 .999 - 77 .80 
Based on observed means. 
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 3.296. 
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
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B4 MANOV A analysis for manipulation checks 
General Linear Model 
Between-Subjects Factors 
N 
Health B 65 
D RO 
p 60 
Law speed LF 89 
LS 96 
Oef speed OF 66 
ON 59 
OS 60 
Multivariate Tests< 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df S1g 
Intercept P1lla1's Trace .935 466.902• 5.000 163 OOO .OOO 
Wilk~' I ::imhri::i OR'> 4RR i:IO?a !l nnn rn~ nnn nnn 
HntPlhnn'~ Tr::irP 14~?? 4RR i:IO?a "nnn rn~ nnn nnn 
Roy's Largest Root 14 322 466 902• 5 OOO 163 OOO OOO 
Health P11la1's Trace .068 1.155 10.000 328 OOO 321 
Wilk~' I ::imhri::i i:i~~ 1 1488 10 nnn 1?R nnn 1?R 
HntPllinn'~ Tr::ir.P 070 1 141 10 nnn 1?4 nnn ~11 
Roy's Largest Root .037 1 228b 5 OOO 164 OOO 298 
Lawspeed Pillai's Trace .030 1.021• 5.000 163 OOO 407 
Wilk~' I ::imhri::i 970 1 0?1• !l nnn rn~ nnn 407 
HntPllinn'~ Tr::ir.P 0~1 1 0?1 8 "nnn rn~ nnn 407 
Roy's Largest Root 031 1 021• 5.000 163.000 407 
Defspeed P11la1's Trace .058 987 10.000 328 OOO 454 
Wilk~' I ::imhrl::i Q4? i:i8R8 10 nnn 1?R nnn 41)1) 
HntPlilnn'~ Tr::irP OR1 Q8!l 10 nnn 1?4 nnn 4'>R 
Roy's Largest Root 048 1.577b 5 OOO 164.000 169 
Health* Pillai's Trace .044 .731 10.000 328 OOO 696 
Lawspeed Wilk~' I ::imhrl::i qi;7 7?88 10 nnn ~?R nnn RQ8 
HntPllinn'~ Tr::irP. 04!l 7?R 10 nnn ~?4 nnn 700 
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Multivariate Tests< 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df 
Intercept P1lla1's Trace 935 466.902° 5 OOO 163 OOO 
W1lkr::'IRmhrlR ORfi llRR AO?" fi OOO 1R::I OOO 
Hn!Plhnn's TrRrP 14 ::!?? 4RR q0:;>• 'i OOO 1R::I OOO 
Roy's Largest Root 14.322 466.902° 5 OOO 163.000 
Health P1lla1's Trace .068 1 155 10.000 328 OOO 
Wilk~' I RmhrlR S:l::l:'I 1 1488 10 OOO ::!?R OOO 
HntP.llinn'~ TrnrP 070 1 141 10 OOO "1?4 OOO 
Roy's Largest Root .037 1 228b 5.000 164 OOO 
Lawspeed Pillai's Trace .030 1 021• 5.000 163 OOO 
Wilk~' I RmhrlR ~70 1 0?1 8 'i OOO 1R"I OOO 
HntPllinn'~ TrRrP 0::11 1 0?1 8 fi OOO 1R"I OOO 
Roy's Largest Root 033 1 096b 5 OOO 164.000 
Health* Pillai's Trace 155 1.342 20 OOO 664 OOO 
Defspeed Wilk~' I RmhrlR R'i? 1 ::144 ?O OOO fi41 'iRO 
HntPll1nn'~ TrRrP 1RR 1 "141 ?O OOO R4R OOO 
Roy's Largest Root .096 3 177b 5.000 166 OOO 
Lawspeed * Pillai's Trace 065 1.098 10.000 328 OOO 
Defspeed Wilk~' I RmhrlR ~::IR 1 o~i:;· 10 OOO "l?R OOO 
Hn!Plhnn'~ TrnrP OR7 1 oq:i 10 OOO "1?4 OOO 
Roy's Largest Root .050 1.628b 5 OOO 164 OOO 
Health* Pilla1's Trace 084 .714 20 OOO 664.000 
Lawspeed * Wilk~' I RmhrlR q1R 70A ?O OOO fi41 fiRO 
Defspeed Hn!Pllinn'~ TrnrP 087 70fi ?O OOO R4R OOO 
Roy's Largest Root .047 1.575b 5.000 166 OOO 
a Exact statistic 
b. The statistic 1s an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level 
c Design: Intercept + Health + Lawspeed + Defspeed + Health * Lawspeed + Health * Defspeed + Lawspeed * 
Defspeed + Health * Lawspeed * Defspeed 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Type Ill Sum of 
Source Variable Squares df Mean Square F 
Sig 
Corrected Model Accent 35 992" 17 2.117 .725 
.OOO 
OOO 
OOO 
OOO 
321 
::l?R 
"1"11 
298 
407 
407 
407 
365 
145 
14'i 
14R 
009 
363 
"IR'i 
"IR7 
155 
814 
R1q 
R?"I 
.170 
Sig. 
774 
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SnPPrh ~n 4R nq8b 17 ? 71? 1 nn ::184 
vnh1mP RO 114° 17 "I 'i"IR 1 ?1"1 ?<;q 
health 94.160d 17 5 539 1 292 .203 
>"ffPrfPri 
mental cond 52.683° 17 3 099 .726 773 
Intercept Accent 2160.264 1 2160 264 739 619 OOO 
SnPPr.h ~n ??Ii::\ R48 1 ??'i"I R48 8~? nn~ nnn 
vnh1mP ?RR4 41? 1 ?8R4 41? q8? 'i80 ooo 
health 3265 954 1 3265.954 762 014 OOO 
>"ffPr!Pri 
mental cond 2573.376 1 2573 376 602 866 OOO 
Health Accent 6.547 2 3.274 1 121 328 
SnPPrh ~n R ?Oli ? ::110? 1 ??8 ?~R 
vnh1mP ::1 o?n ? 1 i:;rn 'i1R i:;q7 
health 14.626 2 7 313 1 706 185 
>"ffPrlPri 
mental cond 20 350 2 10 175 2 384 095 
Lawspeed Accent .694 1 694 .238 .626 
SnPPr.h Rn 4 'i::\1 1 4 'i::\1 1 7q::1 18? 
vnl11mP 1 748 1 1 748 i:;oo 440 
health 6.412 1 6.412 1 496 223 
>"ffPrlPri 
mental cond .113 1 113 .026 871 
Defspeed Accent 3 414 2 1.707 .584 559 
SnPPrh ~n 8 R1::1 ? 4 ::107 1 70'i 18'i 
vnh1mP 8 01/i ? 4 007 1 "17'i ?lifl 
health 20 063 2 10 031 2 341 099 
>"ffPrlPri 
mental cond 9.645 2 4.823 1 130 326 
Health • Lawspeed Accent 1.131 2 .565 .194 824 
SnPPr.h Rn ? i;q8 ? 1 ?qq 'i14 i:;qq 
vnl11mP q qq4 ? 4 qq7 1 714 18"1 
health 4688 2 2 344 .547 580 
>"ffPrlPri 
mental cond 2.806 2 1.403 329 720 
Health • Defsoeed Accent 9 339 4 2 335 .799 527 
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Type Ill Sum of 
Source Variable Squares df Mean Square F S19 
Corrected Model Accent 35.992° 17 2.117 725 .774 
8nPPrh ~n 4fl oqRb 17 ? 71? 1 071 184 
vnh1mP flO 114° 17 ~ 'i1fl 1 ?1 ".\ ?<;q 
health 94 160d 17 5 539 1 292 203 
::iffpr!Prl 
mental cond 52.683° 17 3.099 .726 773 
Intercept Accent 2160.264 1 2160 264 739.619 OOO 
8nPPrh ~n ??'i~ fl4R 1 ??'i~ fl4R Rq? ooq OOO 
vnh1mP ?Rfl4 41? 1 ?Rfl4 41? qR? 'iRO onn 
health 3265.954 1 3265.954 762 014 OOO 
::iffpr!Prl 
mental cond 2573.376 1 2573.376 602 866 .OOO 
Health Accent 6 547 2 3 274 1.121 .328 
8nPPrh ~n fl ?Ofi ? ~ 10? 1 ??R ?!lfl 
vnh1mP ~ O?O ? 1 'i10 'i1R <;q7 
health 14.626 2 7.313 1 706 185 
::iffPrlpn 
mental cond 20.350 2 10.175 2 384 095 
8nPPr.h sn 1fl !l?O 4 4no 1 fl74 1!'iR 
vnh1mP 1R ?flO 4 4fiflfi 1 'iflfl 1Rfl 
health 17 936 4 4.484 1.046 385 
::iffpr.IPrl 
mental cond 9429 4 2.357 .552 698 
Lawspeed * Accent 5.126 2 2.563 .878 .418 
Defspeed 8nPPrh sn 14~ ? 071 O?R q7? 
vnh1mP flfl'i4 ? ~ ~?7 1 141 1?? 
health 14.441 2 7 220 1.685 189 
::lffPrlPrl 
mental cond 3 868 2 1.934 .453 636 
Health * Lawspeed * Accent 10 561 4 2 640 904 .463 
Defspeed 8nPPr.h sn fl 71R 4 1 flRO flfl'i fl17 
vnl11mp 11 !lOfl 4 ? q7f1 1 0?1 ~qR 
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Type Ill Sum of 
Source Variable Squares df Mean Square F S1g 
Corrected Model Accent 35.992" 17 2.117 .725 .774 
SnPPr.h ~n 4R 0~8b 17 ? 71? 1 07~ "184 
vnh1mP RO 114° 17 ~ 'l~R 1 ?1~ ?<;q 
health 94.160d 17 5.539 1.292 203 
RffPr.!Prl 
mental cond 52.683° 17 3 099 .726 773 
Intercept Accent 2160 264 1 2160.264 739 619 OOO 
SnPPrh ~n ??'l"l R48 1 ??!i"l R48 8q? nnq nnn 
vnl11mP ?8R4 41? 1 ?8R4 41? q8? 'l80 nnn 
health 3265.954 1 3265.954 762 014 .OOO 
RffPrlPrl 
mental cond 2573.376 1 2573 376 602 866 OOO 
Health Accent 6.547 2 3 274 1 121 328 
SnPP.rh ~n R ?O'l ? "l 10? 1 ??8 ?qR 
vnh1mP "l O?O ? 1 'l10 'l18 i;q7 
health 14 626 2 7 313 1.706 185 
RffPr.IPrl 
mental cond 20.350 2 10.175 2 384 .095 
health 14.538 4 3.634 .848 497 
RffPrlPrl 
mental cond 6.802 4 1.700 398 .810 
Error Accent 487.770 167 2 921 
SnPPr:h sn 4?1 ~n 1R7 ? !i?R 
vnh1mP 48R 8~7 1R7 ? q1fi 
health 715.754 167 4 286 
RffPr.IPrl 
mental cond 712.852 167 4.269 
Total Accent 2724 OOO 185 
SnPPrh ~n ?780 nnn 18"i 
vnl11mP ~48~ nnn 18!i 
health 4107 OOO 185 
RffPrlPrl 
mental cond 3384 OOO 185 
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Type Ill Sum of 
Source Variable Squares df Mean Square F 
Corrected Model Accent 35.992" 17 2.117 .725 
SnPPr.h sn 4n nqRb 17 ? 71? 1 nr1 
vnh1mP nn 114° 17 ::1 fi::ln 1 ?11 
health 94.160d 17 5 539 1 292 
::iffpr.jprJ 
mental cond 52.683° 17 3.099 726 
Intercept Accent 2160.264 1 2160.264 739 619 
SnPPrh ~n ??fi::I n4R 1 ??fi::I n48 8G? nnR 
vnl11mP ?8n441? 1 ?8n4 41? GR? 'i8n 
health 3265.954 1 3265 954 762.014 
::iffprfPrl 
mental cond 2573.376 1 2573.376 602 866 
Health Accent 6.547 2 3.274 1.121 
SnPPrh ~n n ?nfi ? ::I 1n? 1 ??8 
vnl11mP ::1 n?n ? 1 'i1n 'i18 
health 14 626 2 7.313 1.706 
::iffprfprJ 
mental cond 20 350 2 10.175 2 384 
Corrected Total Accent 523 762 184 
SnPPrh ~n 4n8 n?? 184 
vnh1mP fi4n Gfi1 184 
health 809 914 184 
nff0r!f'rl 
mental cond 765 535 184 
a R Squared = 069 (Adjusted R Squared = - 026) b. R Squared = .098 (Adjusted R Squared = .007) 
c. R Squared= .110 (Adjusted R Squared= .019) d. R Squared= .116 (Adjusted R Squared= .026) 
e. R Squared = .069 (Adjusted R Squared = -.026) 
S1g. 
.774 
1R4 
?'iQ 
203 
773 
OOO 
nnn 
nnn 
.OOO 
OOO 
328 
?Rn 
'iG7 
185 
095 
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BS MANOV A for intent data 
General Linear Model 
Between-Subjects Factors 
N 
Conlnt(O)/Ex(1 )balanced(2) 0 13 
1 35 
2 12 
Multivariate Testsd 
Hypothesis Partial Eta Non cent. Observed 
Effect Value F df Error df S1g. Squared Parameter Powerb 
Intercept P1lla1's Trace .964 744.6258 2.000 56.000 .OOO 964 1489 250 1 OOO 
Wilks' Lambda 036 744 6258 2 OOO 56 OOO OOO 964 1489 250 1 OOO 
Hntellina's Tn:ir.e 2R 594 744 112!i8 2 OOO !in OOO OOO 9114 1489 2!i0 1 OOO 
Roy's Largest Root 26.594 744.6258 2.000 56.000 .OOO 964 1489 250 1 OOO 
ConlntoEx P1llai's Trace 026 .374 4.000 114 OOO .827 013 1 497 133 
1 balanced Wilks' L::imbd::i 974 31198 4 OOO 112 OOO 830 013 1 477 1'.'l2 
2 Hntellina's Tr::ir.e 0211 3114 4000 110 OOO 834 013 1 4!i7 ' 1 ::l1 
Roy's Largest Root 024 .692c 2 OOO 57 OOO .505 .024 1.383 161 
a Exact statistic 
b Computed using alpha = .05 
c The stat1st1c 1s an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level. 
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B6 MANOV A for effect of convergence and divergence on ratings of 
cooperativeness and likeability 
General Linear Model 
Between-Subjects Factors 
N 
con/d1v c 60 
D 66 
Multivariate Testsb 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df S1g 
Intercept Pillai's Trace .973 2252.8048 2.000 123.000 OOO 
Wilks' Lambda 027 2252 8048 2 OOO 123 OOO OOO 
Hntellina's Trace 3n n31 2252 8048 2 OOO 123 OOO OOO 
Roy's Largest Root 36 631 2252.8048 2.000 123 OOO OOO 
condiv Pillai's Trace 001 0588 2.000 123 OOO .944 
Wilks' Lambda 999 0588 2 OOO 123 OOO 944 
Hntellina's Trace 001 0588 2 OOO 123 OOO 944 
Roy's Largest Root .001 .0588 2 OOO 123 OOO .944 
a Exact statistic 
b Design: Intercept+ condiv 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Type Ill Sum of 
Source Variable Squares 
Corrected Model ConvCooo .1668 
ConvL1ke 7.215E-5b 
Intercept ConvCooo 7255.468 
ConvLike 4059 524 
condiv ConvCooo .166 
ConvLike 7 215E-5 
Error ConvCooo 202.191 
ConvLike 449.302 
Total ConvCooo 7471.000 
ConvLike 4518 OOO 
Corrected Total ConvCooo 202.357 
ConvLike 449.302 
a R Squared = 001 (Adjusted R Squared = -.007) 
b R Squared= .OOO (Adjusted R Squared= -.008) 
df Mean Square 
1 166 
1 7.215E-5 
1 7255 468 
1 4059 524 
1 166 
1 7 215E-5 
124 1 631 
124 3.623 
126 
126 
125 
125 
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F S1g. 
.102 .7! 
.OOO m 
4449 646 0( 
1120 363 ,Q( 
.102 7! 
OOO .9f 
B7 Hierarchical Log linear analysis on verdict 
Hierarchical Loglinear Analysis 
Data Information 
N 
Cases Valid 186 
Out of Range0 0 
Missing 0 
Weighted Valid 186 
Categories Health 3 
Lawyer speed 2 
Def Speed 3 
Guilt (o-g,1-i) 2 
a Cases rejected because of out of range factor 
values 
Design 1 
Generating Class 
Number of Iterations 
Max Difference between 
Observed and Fitted Marginals 
Convergence Criterion 
Convergence Information 
Health*Lawyerspeed*DefSpeed*G uiltog 1 i 
1 
.OOO 
250 
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Cell Counts and Residuals 
Lawyer Def Guilt (o- Observed Expected Std 
Health speed Speed g, 1-i) Count" % Count % Residuals Residuals 
0 0 0 0 3 500 19% 3.500 1.9% .OOO OOO 
1 7 500 4.0% 7.500 4.0% OOO OOO 
1 0 2.500 1 3% 2 500 1.3% OOO OOO 
1 8.500 4.6% 8 500 46% OOO OOO 
2 0 2.500 13% 2 500 13% .OOO .OOO 
1 8.500 4.6% 8 500 46% .OOO OOO 
1 0 0 4.500 2.4% 4.500 2.4% .OOO OOO 
1 12.500 6.7% 12 500 67% OOO OOO 
1 0 2.500 1.3% 2.500 1.3% .OOO OOO 
1 8.500 46% 8.500 4.6% .OOO .OOO 
2 0 3.500 19% 3 500 1 9% .OOO .OOO 
1 7.500 40% 7 500 40% .OOO .OOO 
1 0 0 0 5.500 30% 5.500 30% OOO OOO 
1 5.500 3.0% 5.500 3.0% .OOO .OOO 
1 0 3.500 1 9% 3.500 1.9% OOO OOO 
1 7.500 4.0% 7 500 40% OOO· OOO 
2 0 2.500 1.3% 2.500 1.3% .OOO OOO 
1 8 500 4.6% 8.500 46% OOO OOO 
1 0 0 5 500 3.0% 5 500 30% .OOO .OOO 
1 5.500 30% 5.500 3.0% OOO OOO 
1 0 4.500 2.4% 4.500 2.4% OOO .OOO 
1 6.500 3.5% 6.500 35% OOO .OOO 
2 0 8.500 4.6% 8.500 46% .OOO .OOO 
1 2.500 1.3% 2 500 1 3% .OOO OOO 
2 0 0 0 4.500 2.4% 4.500 24% .OOO OOO 
1 6.500 3.5% 6 500 3.5% OOO OOO 
1 0 6 500 3.5% 6 500 35% OOO OOO 
1 4.500 2.4% 4.500 24% OOO OOO 
2 0 4.500 2.4% 
1 6.500 35% 
1 0 0 5.500 30% 
1 5 500 30% 
1 0 2 500 1.3% 
1 8.500 46% 
2 0 4.500 24% 
1 6 500 35% 
a For saturated models, 500 has been added to all observed cells. 
Goodness-of-Fit Tests 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
L1kehhood Ratio .OOO 0 
Pearson .OOO 0 
K-Way and Higher-Order Effects 
K df 
K-way and Higher Order Effectsa 1 35 
2 29 
3 16 
4 4 
K-way Effectsb 1 6 
2 13 
3 12 
4 4 
a Tests that k-way and higher order effects are zero 
b Tests that k-way effects are zero 
Likelihood Ratio 
Chi-Square Sig. 
37.108 372 
22.541 797 
12 485 .710 
3.992 .407 
14.567 .024 
10 056 .689 
8493 .745 
3.992 407 
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4 500 2.4% .OOO OOO 
6.500 3.5% .OOO .OOO 
5.500 30% .OOO .OOO 
5 500 30% OOO OOO 
2.500 13% .OOO OOO 
8.500 4.6% ' OOO .OOO 
4.500 24% .OOO .OOO 
6.500 3.5% .OOO .OOO 
Pearson Number of 
Chi-Square S1g Iterations 
36 968 378 0 
22.608 .794 2 
12.083 .738 3 
3.971 410 3 
14.359 .026 0 
10 525 .651 0 
8 112 .776 0 
3.971 .410 0 
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Backward Elimination Statistics 
Step Summary 
Number of 
Step0 Effects Chi-Squarec df Sig. Iterations 
0 Generating Classb Health*Lawyersp .OOO 0 
eed*DefSpeed*G 
uiltog11 
Deleted Effect 1 Health*Lawyersp 3992 4 407 ~ 
eed*DefSpeed*G 
uiltog1 i 
1 Generating Classb Health*Lawyersp 3 992 4 407 
eed*DefSpeed, 
Health*Lawyersp 
eed*Guiltog1i, 
Health*DefSpee 
d*Guiltog1 i, 
Lawyerspeed*De 
fSpeed*Guiltog1 i 
Deleted Effect 1 Health*Lawyersp 699 4 951 ~ 
eed*DefSpeed 
2 Health*Lawyersp 3.541 2 170 ~ 
eed*Guiltog 1 i 
3 Health*DefSpee .410 4 .982 ~ 
d*Guiltog1i 
4 Lawyerspeed*De 3.903 2 .142 ~ 
fSpeed*Guiltog1 i 
2 Generating Classb Health*Lawyersp 4.401 8 819 
eed*DefSpeed, 
Health*Lawyersp 
eed*Gu11tog1 i, 
Lawyerspeed*De 
fSpeed*Guiltog11 
Deleted Effect 1 Health*Lawyersp .639 4 .959 ~ 
eed*DefSpeed 
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2 Health*Lawyersp 3639 2 162 ~ 
eed*Gu11tog11 
3 Lawyerspeed*De 4.014 2 .134 ~ 
fSpeed*Guiltog 1 i 
3 Generating Classb Health*Lawyersp 5 040 12 957 
eed*Guiltog 1 i, 
Lawyerspeed*De 
fSpeed*Guiltog1 i 
' 
Health*DefSpee 
d 
Deleted Effect 1 Health*Lawyersp 3.556 2 169 ~ 
eed•Guiltog1 I 
2 Lawyerspeed*De 3.969 2 .137 ~ 
fSpeed*Guiltog 1 i 
3 Health*DefSpee .962 4 915 .< 
d 
4 Generating Classb Health*Lawyersp 6 003 16 988 
eed*Gu11tog1 i, 
Lawyerspeed*De 
fSpeed*Guiltog1 i 
Deleted Effect 1 Health*Lawyersp 3.476 2 176 ~ 
eed*Guiltog 1 i 
2 Lawyerspeed*De 3 892 2 .143 .< 
fSpeed*Guiltog 1 i 
5 Generating Classb Lawyerspeed*De 9478 18 .948 
fSpeed*Guiltog 1 i 
' 
Health*Lawyersp 
eed, 
Health*Guiltog 1 i 
Deleted Effect 1 Lawyerspeed*De 3 892 2 143 ~ 
fSpeed*Guiltog 1 i 
2 Health*Lawyersp .515 2 773 .< 
eed 
3 Health*Guiltog1 i 7.217 2 027 .< 
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6 Generating Classb Lawyerspeed*De 9.994 20 .968 
fSpeed*Guiltog11 
' 
Health*Guiltog11 
Deleted Effect 1 Lawyerspeed*DE? 3.892 2 143 L 
fSpeed*Guiltog 1 i 
2 Health*Guiltog 1 i 7.054 2 .029 L 
7 Generating Classb Health*Gu1ltog 1 i, 13.885 22 .906 
Lawyerspeed*De 
fSpeed, 
Lawyerspeed*Gu 
11tog11, 
DefSpeed*Guilto 
g11 
Deleted Effect 1 Health*Guiltog 1 i 7.054 2 .029 L 
2 Lawyerspeed*De .325 2 .850 L 
fSpeed 
3 Lawyerspeed*Gu .309 1 .578 L 
iltog11 
4 DefSpeed*Guilto .912 2 .634 :; 
g1i 
8 Generating Classb Health*Guiltog1 i, 14.211 24 942 
Lawyerspeed*Gu 
iltog1i, 
DefSpeed*Guilto 
g1i 
Deleted Effect 1 Health*Guiltog1 i 7.054 2 .029 L 
2 Lawyerspeed*Gu .337 1 562 :; 
iltog11 
3 DefSpeed*Gu1lto .940 2 .625 :; 
g11 
9 Generating Classb Health*Guiltog11, 15.150 26 .955 
Lawyerspeed*Gu 
11tog1i, DefSpeed 
Deleted Effect 1 Health*Guiltog 1 i 7 054 2 029 :; 
85 
2 Lawyerspeed*Gu .337 1 562 
iltog11 
3 DefSpeed 383 2 826 
10 Generating Classb Health*Guiltog 11, 15.533 28 .972 
Lawyerspeed*Gu 
iltog1i 
a At each step, the effect with the largest significance level for the Likelihood Ratio Change is deleted, provided the 
significance level 1s larger than .050. 
b Statistics are displayed for the best model at each step after step 0. 
c. For 'Deleted Effect', this is the change in the Chi-Square after the effect is deleted from the model 
Health 
0 
Convergence lnformation8 
Generating Class 
Number of Iterations 
Max Difference between 
Observed and Fitted Marginals 
Convergence Criterion 
Health*Guiltog1 i, Lawyerspeed*Gu11tog1 i 
a Statistics for the final model after Backward Elimination. 
Cell Counts and Residuals 
Lawyer Def Guilt (o- Observed Expected 
speed Speed g, 1-1) Count % Count 
0 0 0 3000 1.6% 2.431 
1 7.000 38% 8 333 
1 0 2.000 1.1% 2.431 
1 8.000 43% 8.333 
2 0 2.000 1.1% 2.431 
1 8 OOO 4.3% 8 333 
1 0 0 4.000 2.2% 2.902 
1 12.000 6.5% 8 333 
1 0 2 OOO 11% 2 902 
% 
0 
.OOO 
.250 
1.3% 
4.5% 
13% 
4.5% 
1.3% 
4.5% 
16% 
4.5% 
16% 
Residuals 
.569 
-1 333 
-.431 
-.333 
-.431 
- 333 
1 098 
3 667 
- 902 
Std 
Residuals 
365 
-462 
-.277 
-115 
-.277 
-.115 
645 
1 270 
- 529 
~ 
~ 
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1 8000 4.3% 8.333 45% - 333 - 115 
2 0 3.000 1.6% 2.902 1.6% 098 .058 
1 7.000 3.8% 8.333 4.5% -1.333 -462 
1 0 0 0 5 OOO 2.7% 4.103 22% 897 .443 
1 5.000 2.7% 5.500 3.0% - 500 - 213 
1 0 3.000 16% 4.103 2.2% -1.103 - 545 
1 7.000 3.8% 5 500 30% 1 500 .640 
2 0 2.000 1.1% 4.103 2.2% -2 103 -1.038 
1 8.000 43% 5.500 3.0% 2.500 1.066 
1 0 0 5.000 27% 4897 26% 103 .047 
1 5 OOO 2.7% 5.500 3.0% - 500 -.213 
1 0 4.000 2.2% 4.897 26% - 897 -405 
1 6.000 3.2% 5 500 3.0% .500 213 
2 0 8.000 4.3% 4.897 2.6% 3103 1.402 
1 2000 1.1% 5.500 3.0% -3.500 -1.492 
2 0 0 0 4.000 2.2% 3.799 2.0% .201 103 
1 6.000 3.2% 5.833 3.1% 167 069 
1 0 6 OOO 32% 3 799 20% 2 201 1 129 
1 4.000 2.2% 5 833 31% -1.833 - 759 
2 0 4.000 2.2% 3 799 20% .201 .103 
1 6.000 32% 5.833 3.1% .167 .069 
1 0 0 5.000 27% 4.534 2.4% .466 219 
1 5.000 2.7% 5.833 3.1% -.833 -.345 
1 0 2.000 1.1% 4 534 2.4% -2.534 -1.190 
1 8 OOO 4.3% 5.833 3.1% 2.167 897 
2 0 4.000 2.2% 4.534 2.4% - 534 - 251 
1 6.000 32% 5 833 31% .167 .069 
87 
Goodness-of-Fit Tests 
Chi-Square df Sig 
Likelihood Ratio 15.533 28 972 
Pearson 15.015 28 .978 
